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"The Insiders" for Gambling
Lawsuits: Are the Games "Fair"
and Will Casinos and Gambling
Facilities Be Easy Targets for
Blueprints for RICO and Other
Causes of Action?
by John Warren Kindt*
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

The Insiders for Gambling Lawsuits

As the insider Jeffrey Wigand came forward to rattle the U.S. tobacco
industry,' insiders within the U.S. and Australian gambling establishments began to go public as the twenty-first century began. By 2002
government officials, scholars, and social activists who were experts on
the gambling industry believed that some of the next big industry

* Professor, University of Illinois. College of William and Mary (A.B., 1972); University
of Georgia (J.D., 1976; M.B.A., 1977); University of Virginia (LL.M., 1978; S.J.D., 1981).
Eric Berg, Tyler Baker, and Benjamin Burnham provided valuable assistance in updating,
cite-checking, and editing this analysis. The author and editors attempted to delete
references and source materials too heavily influenced by progambling interests or other
special interests-unless identified as such. For an analysis of public concerns in these
issue areas, see, e.g., John W. Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States
Initiate Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases?, 22 MANAGERIAL & DEc. ECON. 17,
19-21, 27-28, 31-32 (2001).
1. STEPHEN FREY, THE INSIDER (1999) [hereinafter THE INSIDER].
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lawsuits would be targeted at gambling facilities.' Gambling opponents
argued that casinos and gambling facilities fueled gambling addiction
and pursued players who had gambling addiction problems, even after
those players complained to the gambling facility and asked to be
banned.3 Casino owners maintained that their industry was not the
cause of gambling addiction.4 Reportedly concurring with this viewpoint
was Keith Whyte, head of the National Council on Problem Gambling
(NCPG), who was previously employed by the American Gaming
Association (AGA), the gambling industry's lobbying group. Whyte
stated that "[clausation would be very difficult to prove,"5 although

2. See, e.g., John W. Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States Initiate
Mega-Lawsuits Similar to the Tobacco Cases?, 22 MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. 17 (2001)
[hereinafter Mega-Lawsuits];Judy Dehaven & Kate Coscarelli, Gambling Industry Likely
Target for Next Big Suit, HONOLULU STAR-BuLL., June 25, 2002, at C6 [hereinafter
Gambling Likely Target].
3. Gambling Likely Target, supra note 2, at C6. For the diagnostic criteria for
delimiting a pathological ("addicted") gambler, see AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC &
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 615-18, § 312.31 (4th ed. 1994) ("pathological
gambling") [hereinafter DSM-IV].
4. Gambling Likely Target, supra note 2, at C6.
5. Id. (quoting Keith Whyte). The National Council on Problem Gambling (NCPG) has
been criticized for having both substantial financial and administrative links to
progambling interests and for trying to dominate U.S. problem gambling services. In 2003
the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice published a proposed Final
Judgment, Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement in the case of United States v.
National Council on Problem Gambling,Inc., Civil Action No. 1:03CV01279 (filed June 13,
2003) "to obtain equitable and other relief to prevent and restrain violations of Section 1
of the Sherman Act." 68 Fed. Reg. 38090-98 (June 26, 2003). The proposed Final
Judgment enjoined the defendant NCPG from directly or indirectly
A. Initiating, adopting, or pursuing any agreement, program, or policy that has
the purpose or effect of prohibiting or restraining any PGSP [problem gambling
services provider] from engaging in the following practices: (1) selling problem
gambling services in any state or territory or to any customer; or (2) submitting
competitive bids in any state or territory or to any customer.
B. Adopting, disseminating, publishing, seeking adherence to, facilitating, or
enforcing any agreement, code of ethics, rule, bylaw, resolution, policy, guideline,
standard, certification, or statement that has the purpose or effect of prohibiting
or restraining any PGSP from engaging in any of the practices identified in
Section [(A) above] ....
68 Fed. Reg. 38092 (2003). For public comments, including the "interesting issues" which
the Antitrust Division indicated were raised by Professors Joseph E. Finnerty, James A.
Gentry, Fred Gottheil, and John Warren Kindt (i.e., Gambling Research Group), see 68
Fed. Reg. 55654-56 (Sept. 26, 2003). See also Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 2, at 31-32.
For an example of problematic legislation interfacing with the NCPG, see South Carolina
Education Lottery Act § 59-150-230(I) (Supp. 2002) ("A portion... of the unclaimed prize
money.., must be allocated.., to the South Carolina Department of Alcohol and Other
Drug Abuse Services or an established nonprofit public or private agency recognized as an
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several academics and experts disagreed.'
B. The "Pandora'sBox" of the Gambling Industry: The Legal
Discovery of Information
The gambling industry and its associates apparently have a quantum
of in-house information that may make legalized gambling interests
vulnerable to a cornucopia of lawsuits by attorneys general and
plaintiffs' attorneys. After filing cases in many issue areas, trial lawyers
were well-advised to watch for the insiders,7 who could reveal any
potential destruction of relevant documents or concomitant obstruction
of justice, as in the tobacco cases.8 This type of potential scenario was
highlighted in 2001 and 2002 with the felony conviction of Arthur
Andersen for obstructing a federal investigation of the Enron Corporation.9
With regard to progambling interests, the political history indicates a
preoccupation with keeping all information in-house and under control.
In 1996 during the formation of the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission ("NGISC" or "1996-1999 Commission"), the lobbyists for
U.S. gambling interests lobbied desperately to get the subpoena power

affiliate of the National Council on Problem Gambling. . . ." (emphasis added)). See also
Testimony of Assoc. Prof. Howard Shaffer, Ph. D., Editor, Journal of Gambling Studies
(official publication of the National Council on Problem Gambling), in Boan et al. v. Collins
Entertainment Co. et al., CA. No. 3:97-2136-17 (S.C. Dist. June 13, 2003) (crossexamination by plaintiffs counsel Lawrence E. Richter, Jr.).
6. GamblingLikely Target, supra note 2, at C6; Alisyn Camerota, Tort Lawyers Target
Gambling,Fox News Channel Online, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,54083,00.html (May 31, 2002).
7. See THE INSIDER, supra note 1. See generally John W. Kindt, Subpoenaing
Information from the Gambling Industry: Will the Discovery Process in Civil Lawsuits
Reveal Hidden Violations Including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act?, 82 OR. L. REV. 221 (2003) [hereinafter Subpoenaing Discovery Reveal Hidden Violations].
8.

ROBIN REID BOswELL, ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM., OBTAINING THE CASINO'S

INFORMATION 11:1783 (2002) (annual convention reference materials).
9. Kurt Eichenwald & Floyd Norris, Early Verdict on Audit: ProceduresIgnored, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2002, at C6; The Fall of Andersen: Greed Tarnished Golden Reputation,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2002, § 1, at 1. See also The Corporate and Auditing Accountability,
Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the House
Comm. on Fin. Serv., 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) (statement of Michael G. Oxley,
Chairman, Comm. on Fin. Serv.), available at http'//financialservices.house.gov/ hear
ings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=96; Plan Filed by Enron Leaves Little for Creditors,
NEws-GAZETTE (Champaign, IL), July 11, 2003, at Al, A8 (reporting that bankrupt Enron's
creditors will receive 14.4 to 18.3 cents on the dollar, while bankrupt WorldCom's creditors
will receive 36 cents on the dollar).
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stricken from the authority of the Commission.1" The legislative
sponsors of the 1996-1999 Commission," such as U.S. Senators Paul
Simon (D-Ill.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) as well as Charles Morin,"
chair of the 1976-1977 U.S. Commission on the Review of the National
Policy Toward Gambling, 3 strongly opposed the lobbyists' efforts to
strip the subpoena powers from the NGISC. 14
Two types of subpoena powers were at issue: (1) subpoenas to testify
(i.e., subpoenas ad testificandum),5 and (2) subpoenas to produce
documents (i.e., subpoenas duces tecum). 18 In the final legislation, the
Commission's subpoena power to compel testimony from witnesses, such
as company executives, was stripped.' 7 However, the Commission
retained the power to subpoena documents. 8
As the debate intensified over the extent of the Commission's
subpoena powers, it became apparent that the progambling interests
were steadfastly against permitting any process which would allow for
the legal discovery of information. 19 The major trade magazine for the
gambling industry, International Gaming and Wagering Business, °
referenced its Washington contacts to reassure its readership.
"Washington sources also report it's likely that a Senate bill-not the
House bill that was passed several months ago-will be adopted. The
Senate version would
not empower the commission to subpoena records
2
of casino operators."

10. State Involvement Sought in Gaming Study Bill, INT'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus.,
May 1996, at 22 (trade magazine for the gambling industry) [hereinafter Gaming
Interference]; Kenneth Pins, Federal Study of Gambling's Effects Shelved, DES MOINES
REG., June 19, 1996 [hereinafter Study Shelved]; Warren Richey, Anti-Gambling Activists
Warn of Stacked Commission Deck, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 21, 1997, at 3
[hereinafter Stacked Commission Deck]; see also John W. Kindt, Follow the Money:
Gambling, Ethics, and Subpoenas, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 85 (1998)
[hereinafter Follow the Money].
11. See Study Shelved, supra note 10.
12. Letter from Charles H. Morin, Chair, 1976 U.S. Comm'n on the Rev. of the Nat'l
Policy toward Gambling, to Frank R. Wolf, Congressman (May 7, 1996) [hereinafter Chair
Charles Morin Letter] (on file with Charles H. Morin).
13. COMM'N ON THE REV. OF THE NAT'L POLICY TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN
AMERICA, FINAL REPORT (1976) [hereinafter U.S. COMM'N GAMBLING].
14. Chair Charles Morin Letter, supra note 12; Study Shelved, supra note 10.
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1440 (7th ed. 1999).
16. Id.
17. National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, 110 Stat.
1482 (1996); see supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
18. Pub. L. No. 104-169, 110 Stat. § 5(b).
19. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
20. Gaming Interference, supra note 10, at 22.
21. Id.
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The gambling industry favored the Senate bill, presumably because
there was more opportunity to influence or even control the information
that would be forwarded to the 1996-1999 Commission.2 2
If the Senate bill is adopted, as is expected, it is proposed that a
study group would gather information, which would be delivered to the
commission. Early speculation has members of the Washington-based
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), of which
[Nevada Governor Robert] Miller is one of 27 members, comprising the
study group.2"
These types of industry maneuvers to control information outraged the
Congressional sponsors of the Commission.24
During this timeframe, U.S. Representative John Ensign (R-Nev.), who
had family in the gambling industry, 25 worked to eliminate the
Commission's subpoena powers.26 "Ensign said members of the AGIR
would gather information on gaming and present it to the gaming
commission. Just as important, Ensign said, are the assurances he's
received that the subpoena powers of the commission contained in the
House bill are not included in the Senate bill."27
Despite these efforts to control the information going to the 1996-1999
Commission and to eliminate the Commission's subpoena powers, the
Commission still retained a large degree of informational independence
as well as the power to subpoena documents (but not witnesses). For
attorneys general and plaintiffs' attorneys, however, the salient part of
this scenario was to highlight the gambling industry's Pandora's
Box-paranoia involving the legal discovery of information. Furthermore, the gambling industry, its associates, and organizations would
have difficulty limiting the scope of discovery in many instances. The
scope would depend on which gambling issues were addressed, but
because gambling issues are by nature interrelated, the Pandora's Box
could be almost impossible to control.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Stacked Commission Deck, supra note 10; Study Shelved, supra note 10.
See Gaming Interference, supra note 10, at 22.
Id.
Id.
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C. Does the Obfuscation or Control of Information Detrimental to
GamblingFacilitiesby ProgamblingInterests Enhance Plaintiffs' Cases?
The Interface with Qui Tam Causes of Action and Principles
While various forms of gambling activities were being decriminalized
during the last two decades of the twentieth century, progambling
interests reportedly denied the existence of health care costs and other
costs associated with legalized gambling activities.2" The policies and
actions to suppress, obfuscate, or control studies or information reflecting
poorly on the gambling industry could interface with future qui tam
actions where an individual can file suit like a "private attorney general"
on behalf of the government. An example of a potential cause of action
interfaces with the health care costs attributed to pathological gamblers.
Enacted in 1863 to curb military procurement fraud, the False Claims
Act (FCA)29 allows the U.S. government and private plaintiffs (called
"relators") to recover damages from any person or organization that
knowingly presented, or caused another party to present, a false or
fraudulent payment claim to the government.3 ' Recovery amounts
included the costs of the action, fines up to $11,000 per claim, and treble
the government's damages.3 1 Historically in common use, "[ten] of the
first [fourteen] statutes enacted by the first United States Congress
relied on qui tam actions to aid the police enforcement role of government agencies. " " FCA actions constitute a type of qui tam action,
which is the short form of the Latin phrase, qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur which translates to "who as well
for the King as for himself sues in this matter."33 The legal definition
of a qui tam action is: "An action brought under a statute that allows a
private person to sue for a penalty, part of which the government or

28. See, e.g., Rex Buntain, There's a Problem in the House, INT'L GAMING & WAGERING
Bus., July 1996, at 1 (trade magazine for the gambling industry); Matt Connor, Gambling's
Ball and Chain, INT'L GAMING & WAGERING Bus., Oct. 1996, at 64 (trade magazine for the
gambling industry); David Ferrell & Matea Gold, Casino Industry Fights an Emerging
Backlash, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at Al [hereinafter CasinoBacklash]; Damon Hodge,
Problem Gambling: Relocation of GamingCenter Praised,LAS VEGAS REV. J., Nov. 4,2000,
at 30. See also Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 2, at 44-63, tbls. A1-A14.
29. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1983); see also Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, 28

C.F.R. § 85.3 (2001) (increasing the civil monetary awards).
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3.
32. THOMAS R. GRANDE & DAvIS LEVIN LIVINGSTON GRANDE, ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS
OF AM., An Overview of the Federal False Claims Act 1:1179 (2002) (annual convention
reference materials). See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
722 F. Supp. 607, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
33. BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1262 (7th ed. 1999).
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some specified public institution will receive." 34 Between 1986 and
filed using this cause of action-primarily in
1999, over 3000 suits were
35
the health care industry.
D. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt OrganizationsAct (RICO)
and Other Causes of Action
One of the primary areas of legal vulnerability for gambling facilities
was RICO 36 and its parallel state legislation.3 7 RICO actions appeared to cover many potential scenarios involving gambling facilities.
Kansas City attorney Stephen Bradley Small has sued casinos "a
number of times" alleging for example, racketeering. 8
He has handled a racketeering case against the Kansas City casinos
and has represented patrons who say they were wrongfully detained
and accused of cheating.
For "premises liability and garden-variety personal injury claims,
realize that the casinos are self-insured, so be prepared to go to trial,"
advised Small. "From a management perspective, they're paranoid
about crimes their employees may commit and they fire people often,
so employee claims against casinos are plentiful." 9
In private civil cases, several potential causes of action were identified:4 ° (1) RICO (both federal and state); (2) premises liability; (3)
tortious breaches of duty; (4) intentional infliction of emotional (and
mental) distress; (5) negligent infliction of emotional (and mental)
distress; (6) breach of contract (including self-exclusion contract); (7)
breach of constructive or implied contract; (8) fraudulent misrepresentation; (9) punitive damages; and (10) admiralty (perhaps).4 Obviously,
other causes of action could be available depending on the factual
scenarios.

34.

Id.

35. ROBIN POTTER, ASS'N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM., FALSE CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION IN
EMPLOYMENT CASES-A VIEW FROM PLAINTIFFS'/RELATORS' COUNSEL 1:1208 (2002) (annual

convention reference materials).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968(2002). See generallySubpoenaingDiscoveryReveal Hidden
Violations, supra note 7.
37. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-2 (Michie 1998).
38. Stephanie S. Maniscalco, "Self-Exclusion" Program May Create Duty, MO. LAW.
WKLY., Dec. 17, 2000, at 15 [hereinafter Self-Exclusion].
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint for Damages, Williams v. Aztar Indiana
Gaming Corp. (S.D. Ind. 2002) (No. EV-01-75-C-Y/H).
41. Id.
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DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS

A. Private Lawsuits against Gambling Facilities: Various Causes of
Action: Protect the Surveillance Evidence of Big Brother Casino
By the 1990s, several types of lawsuits were being filed against the
rapidly spreading U.S. gambling facilities. These lawsuits included
"patron disputes over their winnings, slip-and-falls, employee rights,
sexual harassment, premises liability, and casino-related automobile
accidents."42 Fred Del Marva, a security expert and forensic investigator in over 350 cases, advised plaintiffs' attorneys that the casinos

would:
fight you right to the ground. Make sure you can finance [your
case], forget about arbitration and mediation and forget about sending
out a letter of demand. It's a waste of time. They'll take you all the
way up until experts' depositions, then after that, maybe they'll start
making decisions.43
The 2002 Chair of the Casino Litigation Group of the American Trial
Lawyers Association, D. Briggs Smith, cautioned plaintiffs' attorneys to
"protect the evidence."" Attorneys need to obtain: (1) the training
manuals; (2) the incident reports; (3) the marketing manuals; (4) the
electronic procedures for video slot machines; and (5) surveillance tapes
and devices (and their locations). 45 The thousands of surveillance
cameras and devices in each casino capture virtually every chip, slot
machine, employee, customer, and area of the gambling facility
(including elevators and hotel facilities). State regulations required that
surveillance tapes and digitals be retained for as little as six to
thirty days;4" therefore, quick action by plaintiffs was imperative.47
Furthermore, some tribal casinos required a filing within as little as
ten days, or the right to a lawsuit was forfeited.4

42. Diana Digges, Casino-RelatedLitigationon the Rise, LAWYERS WKLY. USA, Nov. 26,
2001, at 17 [hereinafter Casino-RelatedLitigation].
43. Id. at 17.
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id.
46. Id. See generally BOSWELL, supra note 8, at 1783 et seq.
47. See Terry Noffsinger, Presentation/Discussion, Casino Gaming Litigation Group,
Am. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 2002 Annual Convention, Atlanta, Ga., July 20-24, 2002 (public
information from filed case complaint) [hereinafter Noffsinger Presentation]. See generally
BOSWELL, supra note 8, at 1783 et seq.
48. Casino-RelatedLitigation, supra note 42, at 17.
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B. Caveats on "Smoke and Mirrors": Expert Witnesses May Be
Directly or Indirectly Funded by ProgamblingInterests
In finding potential expert witnesses in gambling related cases,
plaintiffs' attorneys were well-advised to "follow the money"" and then
specifically determine the history and extent of direct and indirect
funding sources for considerations involving legal impeachment.
Furthermore, the same questions arose regarding studies which looked
unimpeachable on their face but often were linked to funding via
progambling special interest groups.5"
Finally, according to an analysis by the University of Massachusetts
of several gambling industry reports, some gambling studies utilized by
government decisionmakers to decriminalize gambling during the 1980s
and 1990s were notoriously "unbalanced" (i.e., weighted toward
progambling interests). 1 Critics observed that most reports supported
by progambling interests contained inaccuracies or omissions, and the
reports were also discredited by internal "leaked" documents originating
within the gambling industry.52 The analysis prepared by the University of Massachusetts reported eight "unbalanced" and two "mostly
unbalanced" studies, primarily financed by progambling interests.53
The three "mostly balanced" studies were by independent governmentcontracted groups, and the only "balanced" report was by the University
of New Orleans.'
Prior to 1997, the most common and obvious shortcoming of most
"so-called" studies financed or generated by progambling interests was
the dearth, or even total absence, of documentation-particularly

49. See Casino Backlash, supra note 28, at Al; Stephen J. Simurda, When Gambling
Comes To Town: How to Cover a High-Stakes Story, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan./Feb.
1994, at 36-38 [hereinafter When Gambling Comes to Town]; see generally John W. Kindt,
Follow the Money, supra note 10; John W. Kindt, Gambling vs. The New Untouchables:
Credibility Concerns for Academia, Criminal Justice, and the U.S. Supreme Court, Address
at Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva Univ., New York, New York (Nov. 15-16,
1999) (transcript on file with author).
50. See Casino Backlash, supra note 28, at Al; see also COLUM. JOUNRALISM REV.,
supra note 49, at 36-38; John W. Kindt, The GamblingIndustry and Academic Research:
Have Gambling Monies Tainted the Research Environment?, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1
(2003) [hereinafter Gambling Monies Tainted the Research].
51. ROBERT GOODMAN, LEGALIZED GAMBLING AS A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (Ctr. Econ. Dev., U. Mass.-Amherst ed. 1994) [hereinafter CED REPORT].
52. For a discussion and listing of some well-known industry-oriented reports, see
John W. Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized GamblingActivities, 43 DRAKE L. REV.
51, 51-56 nn.3-43 [hereinafter Economic Impacts].
53. See CED REPORT, supra note 51, at Exec. Summary, 68-87.
54. Id.
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footnotes, specific citations, and source materials.55 Many industryfinanced studies simply failed facially for lack of documentation or
research rigor. Since 1997, the few consequential analyses financed
directly or indirectly by progambling interests, such as the Harvard
Meta-analysis," have been criticized for leaving out basic and essential
information necessary for academic corroboration. 7
Studies financed by progambling interests can be criticized as "limitedin-scope." Generally, the proper scope for socioeconomic studies of
gambling issues was not utilized in studies supported by progambling
interests. Richard Leone, a Commissioner on the U.S. Gambling
Commission and President of the Century Foundation, complained that
if the industry "can ... keep the focus of the camera tight enough,""
the results would constitute a distorted view of the actual costs and
benefits
of legalized gambling 5 9-- and often highlight just the bene60
fits.
The proper scope of review for most local socioeconomic analyses is the
gambling industry's own 35-mile radius and 100-mile radius around the
gambling activity."1 These are the "feeder markets" supplying the
gambling activity with gamblers, such as in the case of a casino."

55. See generally, CED REPORT, supra note 51.
56. Howard J. Shaffer et al., Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling
Behavior in the United States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, App. II (President and
Fellows of Harvard College 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis]; Press
Release, Harvard Medical School, Harvard Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence of
Gambling Disorders in North America (Dec. 4, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Division on
Addictions Press Release]. From 0.84 percent in 1993 "the prevalence rate for 1994-1997
grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population." Id.
57. Compare Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 56, app. II (not reporting
the numbers and percentages of pathological and problem gamblers in the 150-172 studies
analyzed), with Economic Impacts, supranote 52, at 89, tbl. II (reporting the numbers and
percentages of pathological and problem gamblers in the studies analyzed).
58. Gambling on the Future, THE ECONOMIST, June 26, 1999, at 27-28.
59. Id.
60. See Richard C. Leone, The False Promise of Casinos, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2001, at
A21; see also JENNIFER BORRELL, GAMBLING IMPACT LITERATURE REVIEW 1 (October 2003).
61. For analyses involving feeder markets, see John W. Kindt, Diminishingor Negating
the Multiplier Effect: The Transfer of Consumer Dollars to Legalized Gambling: Should
A Negative Socio-Economic "Crime Multiplier" Be Included in Gambling Cost/Benefit
Analyses?, 2003 MICH. ST. D.C.L. REV. 281, app. (2002) [hereinafter Crime Multiplier].
62. Press Release, Osage Tribe Economic impact of casino on surrounding 50 mile
region, availableat www.osagetribe.com (July 12, 2001) (net negative cash flow on 50-mile
feeder market around casino equals between $40.25 million and $51 million); see, e.g., Bill
Introduced Allowing "Real Time" Atlantic City Gambling Over Internet, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 8, 2001 ("[Mlore New York casinos will inevitably cut into Atlantic City's 'feeder
markets' in northern New Jersey and New York City.").
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Critics highlight that the gambling industry's use of the terminology
"feeder market" itself reveals the true nature of the socioeconomic
impacts of gambling activity.63 The 35-mile feeder market often
conforms roughly to the size of a U.S. county; therefore, an individual
county's statistics are often the starting point for statistical analysis
(although "cross-county" 35-mile feeder markets must be analyzed and
adjusted for impact variables). 64 While utilizing the 35-mile and
100-mile feeder markets for supplying gamblers to the gambling activity,
studies financed by the gambling industry often focused their cost to
benefit analyses on just the 1-mile or 2-mile radius around the gambling
activity-which prompted the summary complaint by U.S. Commissioner
Leone.
A related criticism of industry-financed studies is that the analyses
are often focused on "preselected positives."65 If the industry can limit
the focus of researchers to known positives or preselected areas or
preselected timeframes, the research can be perfectly valid within those
preselected positive constraints.
In 1995 and 1996, the American Gaming Association lobbying group
financed two so-called studies by Arthur Andersen to justify the
economic benefits of legalized gambling. These oft-cited studies were
titled the Economic Impacts of Casino Gaming in the United States:
Macro Study (AGA /Andersen Macro Study)66 and Economic Impacts of
Casino Gaming in the United States: Micro Study (AGA lAndersen Micro
Study).67 The AGA/Andersen Macro Study found its way into the
citations of the Final Report" of the NGISC, but the Macro Study
(along with the Micro Study) highlighted the problems of industryfinanced studies: (1) relatively few citations (to allow checks by outside
reviewers);69 (2) a limited (or even invalid) scope for review;7" (3) the

63.

Id.; Harrah's Entertainment, Inc., Harrah's Survey of Casino Entertainment (1996);

see generally BEAR STEARNS & Co., N. AM. GAMING ALMANAC (July 2001) [hereinafter 2001
BEAR STEARNS ALMANAC].

64. See generally 2001 BEAR STEARNS ALMANAC, supra note 63.
65. For a discussion and listing of some well-known industry reports, see Economic
Impacts, supra note 52, at 51-56 nn.3-43.
66. Arthur Andersen, Economic Impacts of Casino Gaming in the United States: Macro
Study (Dec. 1996) (prepared for the Am. Gaming Ass'n, Lobbying Group) [hereinafter Am.
Gaming Ass'n/Andersen Macro Study].
67. Arthur Andersen, Economic Impacts of Casino Gaming in the United States: Micro
Study (May 1997) (prepared for the Am. Gaming Ass'n, Lobbying Group) [hereinafter Am.
Gaming Ass'n/Andersen Micro Study].
68.

NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT (June 1999) [hereinafter

NGISC FINAL REPORT]; see also NAVL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, EXECUTvE
SUMMARY (June 1999) [hereinafter NGISC EXEC. SUMMARY].
69. See Am. Gaming Ass'n/Andersen Macro Study, supra note 66 (only 49 footnotes).
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appearance of pre-selected positives-geographic area and timeframes; 7' and (4) little or no analysis involving socioeconomic costs in
the acknowledged "feeder markets."7 2
Another well-known example is the Deloitte and Touche 1992 study
supporting a casino complex for downtown Chicago and financed by
progambling interests.7 3 This 300-page study made virtually no
4
acknowledgement of any socioeconomic costs in the feeder markets.1
Similar criticisms of industry-generated studies were summarized by the
University of Massachusetts researchers in the classic 1994 report,75
funded in part by the Ford Foundation, which analyzed and compared
several industry-generated reports with academic reports.76
C. Suicides Due to PathologicalGambling: Can a Wrongful Death
Action Alone Survive Dismissal?
An increasing number of suicides can be directly linked to pathological
gambling. 7 Allegedly blinded by gambling advertisement revenues, no
Illinois newspapers covered the increased numbers of gambling-related
suicides in Will County, Illinois until the L.A. Times"5 made the
suicides front page news.79 Joliet, Illinois, was the host community for
the two casinos mentioned in the national press story, but in sworn
testimony before the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission, the city's legal
representative, while extolling the virtues of casino gambling, stated
that he was unfamiliar with the negatives revealed in the L.A. Times
story.8 0 Suspicious about the cause of a retired couple's double suicide,
as well as several other area suicides, the Will County coroner was

70. See Am. Gaming Ass'n/Andersen Micro Study, supra note 67 (only three
communities analyzed).
71. Id. (only relatively new markets analyzed over relatively few years).
72. See Am. Gaming Ass'n/Andersen Macro Study, supra note 66; Am. Gaming
Ass'n/Andersen Micro Study, supra note 67; see also supra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text.
73. Chicago Gaming Comm'n, Economic and Other Impacts of a Proposed Gaming,
Entertainment and Hotel Facility (May 19, 1992) (Deloitte & Touche, Chicago, IL)
[hereinafter Proposed Gaming].
74. Id.
75. See generally CED REPORT, supra note 51.
76. Id. at 68-87.
77. Stephen Braun, Lives Lost in a River of Debt, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1997, at Al,
A14-15 [hereinafter Lives Lost].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Corporation Counsel for the City of Joliet, Illinois, Testimony before the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission (May 20, 1998); contra, David Elsner, Joliet
Merchants Fail to Cash in on Gambling, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 1994, Metro Sec., at 1.
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forced to issue coroner's subpoenas to two casinos."
After more
subpoenas were issued for gambling records, the subpoenaed information
demonstrated that several recent suicide victims had experienced
82
significant or total asset losses due to legalized gambling activities.
With hundreds to thousands of surveillance cameras in each casino
watching virtually every chip and slot machine, the duty to monitor
pathological and problem gamblers would seem to be a natural
obligation of the premises and could become a recognized legal duty by
the early twenty-first century-regardless of whether the pathological or
problem gambler had alerted any specific gambling facility. As the
twenty-first century dawned, however, notice given to the gambling
facility regarding the pathological or problem gambler was a significant
addition to any plaintiff's case.
Mrs. Debra Kimbrow filed a $50 million lawsuit in 1994 against
Splash Casino based in Tunica, Mississippi, claiming that her husband
Eric Kimbrow's pathological "gambling problem was so bad that he killed
himself' 83 and that the casino "company exploited Kimbrow's weakness. " s4 "Kimbrow, 43, shot himself in the chest after running up
$100,000 in debt with Splash. In the Memphis lawsuit, his wife said the
casino let her husband-known there as a problem gambler--cash his
personal checks even after he bounced some."8"

81. Lives Lost, supra note 77, at A14-15.
82. Id. Professor David P. Phillips published a 1997 report, Elevated Suicide Levels
Associated with Legalized Gambling, which revealed that suicide rates in communities and
cities with legalized gambling were two to four times higher than in nongambling venues
with comparable populations. David P. Phillips, Ward R. Welty & Marisa Smith, Elevated
Suicide Levels Associated with Legalized Gambling, 27 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING
BEHAV. 373 (1997); see Sandra Blakeslee, Suicide Rate is Higher in 3 GamblingCities, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at A10.
In Ottawa, Canada, during 2003 it was reported that "statistics indicate[d] 126 gambling
addicts have killed themselves since 1999, an alarming increase from 27 such suicides
recorded in the five years before that," and Canadian experts attributed this increase to
the video lottery terminals in bars (which were legalized in 1994). Gambling-Related
Suicides Soar, LAS VEGAS SUN, Oct. 3, 2003. Additionally, a 2003 "investigation by The
Canadian Press found more than 10 percent of suicides in Alberta and more than six
percent in Nova Scotia were linked to gambling in 2001," which prompted Canadian
officials "to standardize the collection of [Canadian] suicide data related to gambling."
Louise Elliott, Former Copps Coliseum Exec to Sue Ontario, Aug. 19, 2003, available at
http'//cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2003/08/19/164161-cp.html.
For examples of how U.S. stories linking legalized gambling to increased suicides have
been supressed, see Lives Lost, supra note 77.
83. Bloomberg Bus. News, CasinosMay be Flush With Suits, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1996,
§ 5, at 4 [hereinafter Flush With Suits].
84. Id.
85. Id.
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Plaintiff's attorney, Tom Brockman, modeled his cause of action on an
extrapolation of the dram shop laws. 6 Dram shop laws hold bars liable
for drunk driving accidents if bartenders do not cut off drunk customers
and facilitate their safe travel away from the bars. "In Kimbrow's case,
just replace drinks with virtually unlimited credit, said [plaintiff's
attorney] Brockman: 'Feeding Eric Kimbrow credit was the equivalent
of feeding him alcohol.'" 87 Of course, casino defense attorneys disagreed with such a legal extrapolation. In any event, by 1996 Splash
Casino was bankrupt, and the Kimbrow case was "lost in the shuffle."8 8
D. Monetary Losses Due to "Pathological"Gambling: Actual or
Constructive "Self-Exclusion"Notice to the Gambling Facility via
Patron "Cards"
In a 2003 case in Evansville, Indiana, Williams v. Aztar Indiana
Gaming Corp.,89 Williams, who had never before gambled at a casino,
visited the Aztar casino after receiving a free $20 coupon in January
1996, approximately six months after the casino opened.9 ° Plaintiff's
attorney, Terry Noffsinger, claimed that Williams lost the $20, went
back the next day and lost $800, and eventually lost everything-which
was about $175,000."' As they interfaced with defendant Casino Aztar,
relating to RICO provided a partial
the claims in the Williams complaint
92
blueprint for similar cases:
a. Aztar constitutes an "enterprise" as that term is defined in the
RICO statutes.
b. Aztar has engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity" by
intentionally engaging in at least two acts of "racketeering activity" as
defined by RICO.
has engaged are
c. The acts of "racketeering activity" in which Aztar
93
acts of "mail fraud" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
d. Aztar has committed mail fraud by utilizing the United States
Mail as part of a scheme or artifice to defraud Williams, or to obtain
from him money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations,.., or promises.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., No. EV-01-75-C-Y/H (S.D. Ind. filed May
7, 2001).
90. Noffsinger Presentation, supra note 47.
91. Id.
92. Third Amended Complaint for Damages at 7-8, Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming
Corp. (S.D. Ind.filed Jan. 4,2002) (No. EV-01-75-C-Y/H) [hereinafter Williams Complaint].
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
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e. Aztar has done so by, among other things, using the mail to
assert that Aztar, by and through.., or other identified representatives or agents, would not permit Williams to enter and gamble at the
(clasino without first providing "medical/psychological information
which demonstrate[d] that [his] patronage of [Aztar's] facility pose[d]
no threat to [Williams'] safety ... or well being[,]" and on multiple
occasions thereafter to issue promotional materials to Williams
designed to lure him to the [clasino for purposes of gambling, as shown
in rhetorical paragraph 15 of this Complaint.
f. Aztar has intentionally engaged in multiple incidents of such
conduct with respect to Williams.'
Under federal RICO, the damages which could be claimed included: (1)
an amount equal to three times his actual damages; (2) the costs of the
action; and (3) reasonable attorney's fees.95 Along with any parallel
state RICO statute, as in the state of Indiana,9 " other damages would
probably be recoverable, such as punitive damages.9 7
III.

CLARIFICATION OF GOALS

A. Actual or Implied "Self-Exclusion" Notice to Gambling Facilities:
The Governmental-SocietalGoals of Imposing Duties on Gambling
Facilities
Despite the decriminalization of casino gambling in Missouri in 1992
and the reauthorization of slot machines in November 1994, it took until
1996 for Missouri to create a self-exclusion program to keep pathological
gamblers from casino facilities.9" Arguendo, this delay in protective
legislation per se indicated the progambling interests' impact on and
dominance of the draftsmanship of the primary Missouri legislation.
While it was obvious that self-exclusion was a necessary option from
experience in other long-term gambling states, the self-exclusion option
was left out of the original Missouri legislation-as it was in all states
decriminalizing casino gambling during the 1990s. To the credit of some
Missouri legislators, the self-exclusion option was created in 1996 while
most other states still ignored it. Thus, the existence and timing for
enacting self-exclusion statutes became one barometer indicating the
degree of influence of progambling lobbyists in individual states. For
example, New Jersey, which was the second state to get casino gambling

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Williams Complaint, supra note 92.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(c) (2002).
See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-2 (Michie 1998).
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-24-2, 1-8 (Michie 1998)
See Self-Exclusion, supra note 38, at 15.
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in 1976, did not create a self-exclusion program until 2001, and it was
the fifth state to do so. 99
Under the Missouri Gaming Commission's self-exclusion program,
pathological gamblers could voluntarily indicate that they wished to be
banned permanently from Missouri casinos.' 00 By 2000 the Missouri
"List of Disassociated Persons" included "more than 3,500 names with
about 90 people joining each month."'0 ' The head of the Missouri
Gaming Commission indicated that each month, five to eight people were
arrested for violating their bans. 10 2 St. Charles attorney Joseph J.
Porzenski noted that "while the program makes it clear that gamblers
who violate the ban may not keep their winnings, there is no provision
to return to them any money lost." 0 3 This provision was another
indication of the legislative draftsmanship giving the casinos the "winwin" policy of keeping everything-even when the casinos themselves
had not kept banned pathological gamblers from gambling. Specifically,
the sign-up procedure involved
providing the applicant a copy of the applicable state regulation with
instructions, a two-page verbal questionnaire administered by Gaming
Commission staff, an application, a waiver/release form, and a power
of attorney form for the release of the information to the casinos. The
forms state that the applicant must be sober, understand the ban is for
life and makes them ineligible to retain any winnings and may result
14
in the denial of service at affiliates of the casino in other states.
Since the self-exclusion forms acknowledge that Missouri casinos have
affiliates in other states, the de facto reach crosses state lines and
invokes issues of interstate commerce, the Commerce Clause,0 5 and
long-arm statutes.
Accordingly, the national trend would involve lawsuits against
gambling facilities "for failure to exclude gambling addicts." 6 "The
theory is simple: Once a player puts a casino on notice that he or she
is a pathological gambler-and asks to be banned from the casino,

99. Diana Digges, Stakes Rise in "Compulsive Gambling"Suits,LAWYERS WKLY. USA,
Nov. 26, 2001, at 16 [hereinafter Stakes Rise].
100. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 313.813 (West 2001).
101. Self-Exclusion, supra note 38, at 15.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
106. Self-Exclusion, supra note 38, at 15.
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receiving promotional material or using check-cashing privileges-the
10 7
casino can be held liable if it doesn't abide by the agreement."
The existence or nonexistence of specific state regulations establishing
a self-exclusion program, such as in Missouri, would not necessarily be
determinative of the duty that the gambling facility has to keep
pathological gamblers out of its facilities throughout the nation. At some
point, courts will probably recognize a universal duty by all gambling
facilities to ban all pathological and problem gamblers. For example,
because 27 percent to 55 percent of all casino revenues come from just
pathological gamblers,' gambling interests will be financially motivated to establish judicial precedents for a "duty" forcing casinos to allow
pathological gamblers on their premises. Theoretically, the casinos could
then argue that they are absolved from any responsibility toward
pathological gamblers.
However, in those states with a self-exclusion program, by 2000 it was
becoming increasingly recognized that gambling facilities and
the casinos have assumed a duty to keep the gamblers off the
boats-and they breach that duty when a gambler slips in and loses
thousands of dollars. "Even though they stress that it is the gambler's
responsibility to stay off the boat, it looks like casinos may be creating
some sort of duty to protect the gamblers from themselves," said
St. Charles attorney Joseph J. Porzenski.0 9
B.

Goals and Case Precedents

The predicted trend toward imposing duties on gambling facilities was
evidenced as the twentieth century ended. In 1999 several Louisiana
casinos settled a lawsuit with pathological gambler Joe McNeely.'
The former Louisiana Tech football star lost his business and marriage
over gambling debts. Although he did not register himself in Louisiana's self-exclusion program, he did notify the casinos in writing that
they should stop targeting him for business. The casinos not only
failed to respect his wishes, McNeely claimed, but upped the ante by
sending their executives to see him when he was at his most vulnerable-most notoriously, at his mother's funeral."'

107. Stakes Rise, supra note 99, at 16.
108. See Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 2, at 25, Table 1.
109. Self-Exclusion, supra note 38, at 15.
110. Stakes Rise, supra note 99, at 16.
111. Id.
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The 1999 settlement was confidential because the casinos did not want
to reveal the extent of their "deep pockets" or be viewed as "easy
targets."
A similar New Orleans "case testing self-exclusion principles"" 3
resulted in another confidential settlement for an undisclosed amount
during the Spring of 2001. "A man had notified a casino of his addiction,
asking not to be sent promotional 'freebies.' When the casino did so
anyway, he fell back into gambling, incurred enormous debts and
committed suicide."1 4 In this instance the suicide appeared to help
determine the extent of damages vis-&-vis a wrongful death action.
In Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp.," the plaintiff's claimed
facts were illustrative of similar case scenarios." 6
Relevant Dates:

1196
1/96
5/13/96
5/16/96
3/97
4/97
3/18/98
3/19/98
3/27/98
4/22/98
1/10/99
11/4/99
11/13/99
5/9/00

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

First visit to Casino Aztar.
(Next day) Loses $800 on second visit to Aztar.
"Fun Card" issued to Williams.
First trip to Aztar using "Fun Card."
Total Losses = $72,186!
Girlfriend places first phone calls to Aztar expressing concern
over Williams's behavior.
Girlfriend again talks with Aztar representative via telephone
regarding her concerns about Williams's behavior.
Girlfriend writes letter to Aztar asking it to ban Williams from
the boat; sends information to document problem.
Aztar sends its Cease Admission Letter to Williams.
Ejection notice on Williams "submitted" internally within Aztar.
Williams returns to Aztar, after being banned.
Aztar sends its December or January offer: "no one gives you
more in December than Casino Aztar!"
Holiday Party High: Williams was one of Aztar's "very best
players."
June Newsletter Offer: "you are our most loyal guest," and
"check out the Hot Slots 100 posted in the Fun Center to find out
where the big payouts are."

Id.
Id.
Id.
No. EV01-75-C-Y/H (S.D. Ind. filed May 7, 2001).
Noffsinger Presentation, supra note 47.

2004]
7/18/00

7/24/00
5/7/01

GAMBLING LAWSUITS

547

August Newsletter Offer: "new machines are arriving all the
time so you'll have even more chances to win. And check out the
Hot 100 Slots posted in the Fun Center and discover where the
big payouts are." ["In a real slot machine, there's no skill
involved."--Deposition of Casino Aztar]
Williams's last visit to Aztar
Lawsuit filed." 7

In Williams Judge Learned Hand's test was paraphrased that "if the
burden or cost to the defendant of providing precautions is less than the
probability of harm times the seriousness of the harm, if it occurs, then
the defendant [casino] violates its duty."118
C. Mega-Lawsuits and the Legal Discovery of Marketing Information
Directed at Gambling's Market Segments: The Gambling Facilities'
Interface with "PlayerGroups"
In 1994 Florida residents William Poulos and William Ahern filed
separate lawsuits against approximately seventy defendants in the
gambling industry, and in 1995 the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada combined these cases as Poulos v. Caesars World,
Inc. n9 Plaintiffs had lost large amounts of money playing slot machines, their successor electronic gambling machines (EGMs), and video
20
gambling machines (VGMs) during the previous twenty years.
Among other allegations, plaintiffs "claimed that the machines induced2
them to play by misrepresenting their actual odds of winning." 1

117.
118.

Id.
Williams Complaint, supra note 92. For similar cases, see Rick Alm, Lawsuits say
Harrah'soffered Improper Credit, KANSAS CITY STAR, May 31, 2002, at Dl.
119. CV-S-94-1226 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev. filed Jan. 8, 1998). See also Poulos v. Caesars
World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-LDG (RJJ) (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.) (base file); Ahern v. Caesars
World, Inc., CV-S-94-1137-LDG (RJJ) (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.) (base file). See generally
Opinion of Chief U.S. Dist. Judge Lloyd D. George on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss,
Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-LDG (RJJ) (Nev. 1996) (requiring an amended
complaint) (base file); Second Consolidated Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, Poulos
v. Caesars World, Inc., Class Action, CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ) (D. Nev. 1998) (base file)
[hereinafter Poulos Second Complaint].
120. See Poulos Second Complaint, supra note 119.
121. David Strow, Garners Face Wider FraudLawsuit, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 22, 1999,
at Cl [hereinafter Fraud Lawsuit]. Order to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction,
Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ) Dec. 19, 1997 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.);
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Poulos v.
Caesars World, CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ), Dec. 19, 1997 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.); Order
Denying Cruise Ship Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ), Dec. 19, 1997 (U.S.
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Plaintiffs also alleged a classic case of fraud, but in 1997 the Nevada
district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to plead
the court denied the motion to dismiss
fraud with particularity; however,
122
for failure to state a claim.
The many defendants included land-based casino operators, slot and
video gambling manufacturers, and cruise ship casinos. The press
realized the importance of Poulos because plaintiffs were "suing virtually
every major casino operator and slot manufacturer... [and] asking a
federal judge for access to documents . . . [which allegedly] prove[d] a
long-term effort was made by industry players to intentionally mislead
slot players." 23 While defendants' public relations (PR) representatives would have an obvious interest in limiting the public's knowledge
of these potential issues, the Nevada press was outlining the relevant
industry information that the legal discovery process could unearth.
Such documents could include marketing materials, memos, presentation materials and slot operations manuals. The plaintiffs are also
seeking access to casino player records, which they claim will show
that the playing habits of the defendants are typical among slot
players. The amount of records being sought is considerable; since they
would have to demonstrate a widespread history of such marketing, the
plaintiffs are demanding materials that go back a decade or more.' 24
In addition, plaintiffs' requests for information in Poulos provided a
blueprint for future discovery requests in other pending cases.
What the plaintiffs are now seeking are any documents and materials
that will show [that] slots and video poker machines have always been
marketed in a misleading way, and that slots players perceive the
machines in the same manner as the defendants. One example would
be a video poker machine that claims it deals from a 52--card deck,
when in fact it deals from 10 preselected cards. Another would be a
slot that repeatedly places winning symbols near the payline, giving

Dist. Ct. Nev.); Order Denying Defendant's Motion for a Stay on Primary Jurisdiction and
Abstention Grounds, Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ), Dec. 19, 1997
(U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.); Order Denying Defendant Princess Hotel's Motion to Dismiss under
The Act of State Doctrine, Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ), Dec.
19, 1997 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.); Order (motion for class certification -991), Poulos v. Caesars
World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-RLH (RJJ), June 26, 2002 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Nev.).
122. See supra note 119; Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 9(b) for Failure to Plead Fraud with Particularity and
Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a
Claim, Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ), Dec. 19, 1997 (U.S. Dist.
Ct. Nev.) (base file).
123. FraudLawsuit, supra note 121.
124. Id. at C1-C2.
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the player the impression of just missing a big jackpot. To achieve
class action status, the plaintiffs ... [were] trying to prove such
methods are pervasive among the defendants.125
Furthermore, while the discovery of information in the United States
was important, plaintiffs' attorneys were well-advised to note that
because most defendants were multinational corporations, there were
opportunities to obtain relevant marketing information including public
information and internal memos from the international facilities that
were owned by the U.S.-based companies.
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Are the Gambling Industry's Games Really "Fair"? Case TRends
Challenging "Fairness":Missouri ex rel. Small v. Ameristar Casino
Kansas City, Inc. 126
For all practical purposes, the "games," as "refined" by the gambling
industry, have a built-in edge for "the House" with the inevitable result
that over time the House will always win the entire amount of money
wagered-a principle known as "gambler's ruin. "127
Statistically, a
gambler can therefore only come out ahead if there is a short-term
128
positive cash "win"-and then the gambler never wagers again.
However, sociologists point to the overwhelming significance of the first
"win" or "apparent win" for the novice gambler, which serves to "hook"
the new gambler into continued gambling.'29 Basic statistics indicate
that continued gambling can only lead to gambler's ruin.13 °
These scenarios raised the strategic and practical issues of fairness-that is, were those jurisdictions promoting state-sponsored
gambling really giving each of their citizens a fair chance of having the
short-term positive cash win accompanied by a final exit from gambling?
The gambler's ruin principle suggested that the policies of the states
were not fair because they promoted and advertised "continued

125. Id. at C1.
126. No. CV103-3190CC (C.C. Mo. filed May 12, 2003). This case blueprints several
causes of action in these issue areas.
127. For statistical formulae demonstrating the inevitable "gambler's ruin," see Michael
Orkin & Richard Kakigi, What is the Worth of Free Casino Credit?, AM. MATHEMATICAL
MONTHLY, Jan. 1995, at 3 [hereinafter Free Credit].
128. See id.
129. See generallyHENRY R. LESIEUR, THE CHASE: CAREER OF A COMPULSIVE GAMBLER
(1984) [hereinafter THE CHASE].
130. Free Credit, supra note 127.
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gambling." The gambler's ruin principle delimited that over time each
gambler would always lose.
These problematic areas also raised specific issues regarding
fairness-that is, were the states with state-sanctioned gambling really
monitoring the fairness of individualized games, and were the states'
regulators adequately trained? Were the states also deferring to
determinations of fairness as formulated by the Nevada gambling
interests or other interests with inherent conflicts of interest?
In 1999, the 1996-1999 Commission suggested throughout its Final
Report... that locales and states with various government-sanctioned
gambling facilities had relied to their detriment and the detriment of
their citizens, on the regulatory mechanisms and legislative advice of
progambling lobbyists.132 Therefore, early in the twenty-first century,
individuals began challenging the state regulatory mechanisms via the
judicial system.13
In 2003 the leading-edge case of Missouri ex rel. Small v.Ameristar
Casino Kansas City, Inc.'34 prompted questions involving fairness and
an allegedly defective video gambling machine (VGM)."3 ' The lawsuit
alleged that "the casino and the state commission knowingly allowed a
defective slot machine to continue to operate."136 The machine at issue
was manufactured by International Game Technology (IGT).'3 7 For
the first time, a judge, as distinguished from a gambling agent, ordered
an electronic gambling machine "pulled off the floor" of a casino, and
attorney "Small also implied that the other 3,000 ...[casino's] machines
...[were] at risk." 3 '
Also termed collectively as "electronic gambling devices" (EGDs), these
VGMs appeared to be particularly vulnerable to challenges as in Small,
because by the beginning of the twenty-first century, VGMs were
providing from 50 percent (as an upper legal limit in Nevada only) to 90

131. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 68, at ch. 3, 1-28.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Writ of Mandamus & Writ of Prohibition for Product Liability, State ex
rel. Small v. Ameristar Casino Kansas City, Inc., CV103-3190CC (C.C. Mo. 2003)
[hereinafter Small Relator Writ of Mandamus].
134. No. CV103-3190CC (C.C. Mo. filed May 12, 2003).
135. Id.
136. Judge Orders Slot Machine Pulled from Ameristar Casino, KANSAS CITY
CHANNEL.COM(May 12,2003), athttp://www.thekansascitychannel.com/news/2198782/detail.html [hereinafter Judge Orders Slot Machine Pulled]; see also Temporary Restraining
Order, State ex rel. Small v. Ameristar Casino Kan. City, Inc., No. CV103-3190CC (C.C.
Mo. 2003).
137. Judge Orders Slot Machine Pulled, supra note 136.
138. Id.
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percent of the revenues in most casinos (and 100 percent in many
casinos). Furthermore, the VGMs were controlled by the gambling
,industry's various VGM "chips," and almost uniformly state laws
mandated that VGMs "be based only on luck and chance, [although]
many players [have a false] sense that skill makes a difference."'3 9
In the complaint in Small, numerous allegations were raised relating
to specific issues of fairness as well as supposed improprieties.14 °
Several allegations were directed to issues concerning the networking
between the centralized computer systems, the VGMs, and the chips
controlling the VGMs:
One particular chip ... [allegedly] permits cheating and stealing
through the entry of a sequence of player activated button pushes.
When this occurs, the machine empties its hopper and consequently
reflects that it has "paid out" a higher number of coins than actually
has occurred. This chip has existed in the thousands of ... [various]
slot machines at [various casinos] ..... 4

The allegations in the complaint in Small were backed by multiple
citations to the operational information accompanying the patents for
chips formulated to perform specialized VGM functions.'
Specifically,
the complaint included allegations that:
The slot machine as all ... [of the other various] slot and video poker
machines are networked through communication links to central
computer processing equipment .... All game data is communicated
between a gaming machine and the central computer. Pursuant to the
... (jackpot system], the gaming machine requests and central
computer periodically communicate packets of game/prize information
to the slot machines. As these packets of information are depleted by
wagering activity, additional packets of information are requested by
the machine and transmitted from the ... computer suite. The content
of the packets are win/loss and jackpot prize instructions. Most if not
potentially all of the stacks and sub stacks of packets can be preset by
the casino to contain no winning progressive jackpot. Through this

139. J. Taylor Buckley, The Quest for Gambling's "Holy Grail," Industry Seeks NextGenerationSlot Machine, U.S.A. TODAY, May 20, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Gambling's"Holy
Grail" Slot Addictive Game] (quoting Whittier Law Professor I. Nelson Rose).
140. See generally Small Relator Writ of Mandamus, supra note 133. Attorney Small
found language in the patents for the chip driving the electronic gambling machines which
was embarrassing and damaging to casinos and the developers of the chips. See, e.g., Berg,
et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,779,545 (issued July 14, 1998).
141. Small Relator Writ of Mandamus, supra note 133, at 6.
142. See, e.g., Berg, et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,779,545 (issued July 14, 1998); Small
Relator Writ of Mandamus, supra note 133, at 6.
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can assure that jackpots are not awarded for
methodology the casino
43
the indefinite future. 1

Allegations involving the extent to which the VGMs could be controlled
by the operators of the VGMs were also raised in the Small complaint.
The complaint established the groundwork for expert testimony
involving the degree of control exercised by VGM owners and operators.
The parameters for the VGM issues to be reviewed in future cases were
established by Small.
The casino can also dispense a packet with a jackpot winning
instruction to a particular machine to force a jackpot to be awarded to
a particular player at a predetermined time. The casino can also take
the slot machine in question off line to prevent it from receiving large
MGC [Missouri Gaming Commission]
prize award instructions ....
regulations require maintenance of all communications with gaming
machines. Through this communications system, the casino can
manage the timing and location of jackpots as well as to whom the
jackpots are awarded and maximize its return (as well as progressive
financial losses to players, some of which may or can result in
devastating damage including personal or financial ruin). Through this
system the casino can also systematically win money from any given
individual or plurality of players, most particularly those it has
targeted [particularly via Customer Cards]. The casino can also award
jackpots or other prizes to selected players including potentially its
confederates.
While none of the allegations in Small were accepted by the court, this
case highlights issue areas which could easily encourage future cases.
In addition, the relator attorney, Stephen Bradley Small, claimed that
several salient issues were not even addressed and that the judge's
limited focus concentrated only "on testimony about one of several
computer chips"145 that drove the VGM. A summary of the court
testimony supported Small's claims."
The Missouri Gaming Commission earlier this year [20031 revoked the
license for that chip after determining that a programming flaw could
allow a player-in collusion with an accomplice with access to the
chip-to cheat the machine by tricking it into playing excess amounts
of jackpot coins.

143.
144.
145.
May 16,
146.

Small Relator Writ of Mandamus, supra note 133, at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Rick Alm, Judge Puts Ameristar Slot Machine Back in Action, KAN. CITY STAR,
2003, at C2.
Id.
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Commission gaming enforcement manager Clarence Greeno testified
that the programming flaw "had nothing to do with game outcomes."
Small, however, argued... in court that "this chip cheats players," and
he insisted that it continues to do so because the commission has
allowed the flawed
chip to remain in that lone machine until its big
147
jackpot is won.
The court's myopic focus and refusal to consider most of the issues raised
in the Small complaint appeared to frustrate plaintiff. The court also
appeared reluctant to become enmeshed in issues involving the
technological guidance systems for the VGMs.
Greeno testified that the casino sought a waiver to continue using the
chip in order not to create a public perception that its big jackpot game
was being manipulated in any way. When Small attempted to crossexamine Greeno, Mike Bradley, an assistant attorney general
representing the commission, successfully objected and halted Greeno's
testimony before it could become a matter of public record.'
The judge ruled that the specific VGM at issue could be placed back in
the casino.149 Although this case did not establish precedent per se,
many arguments highlighted in the fifty-page Small complaint
emphasized the vulnerability of casinos computer networks to future
litigation, and the complaint serves as both a blueprint and a menu of
future causes of action. 150
B.

Consequences of Gambling Facilitiesas Bars

Since most gambling facilities not only serve alcohol, but also have a
large monetary incentive to ply customers with free alcoholic drinks to
keep them gambling, one cause of action would be predicated on dram
shop principles of liability. Gambling facilities are very similar to
bars. 5 ' A front page Wall Street Journal article summarized the
drunk driving and gambling issues for government action, as well as the
gambling industry's fight against any liability for alcohol-related
injuries.'52

147. Id.
148. Id.
149.

Id.

150. See generally Small Relator Writ of Mandamus, supra note 133.
151. Jeffrey C. Hallam, Comment, Rolling the Dice: Should Intoxicated Gamblers
Recover TheirLosses?, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 240, 241 (1990) [hereinafter Intoxicated Gamblers
Losses]; Joseph T. Hallinan, High Rollers: At Riverboat Casinos, the Free Drinks Come
with a Tragic Toll, WALL ST. J., at Al, A22 [hereinafter Casinos Free Drinks Tragic Toll].
152. Casinos Free Drinks Tragic Toll, supra note 151, at Al; see also Patrick Graham,
Casinos Fight DUIBill Pushing Club Liability, NEV. APPEAL, June 6, 1995.
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Since at least 1979, the academic community has known that "[a]
strong correlation exists between gambling and alcohol consumption...
[with one study concluding] that gamblers consume alcohol on four times
One academic report
as many days per year as non-gamblers."15
observed that it was "impossible to state whether gambling activities
increase alcohol consumption or vice versa, but the relationship is
strong.""5
However, "the level of alcohol consumption rises as the
amount a gambler wagers per year increases." 5 5
Despite these facts, gambling facilities typically pressure against
restraints on the consumption of alcohol. In 1999 these scenarios were
exemplified in Illinois when three casinos lobbied for (and all of the
casino licensees apparently supported) an extension of the hours during
which the casinos could serve alcohol-from twenty-two hours a day to
twenty-four hours a day. 5 ' In a hearing on October 26, 1999, before
the Illinois Gaming Board in Chicago, the casinos were vilified as de
facto "super-bars," and the time extension was opposed by representatives of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), the National Coalition
Against Legalized Gambling (NCALG, a charity like MADD), Illinois
Church Action on Alcohol Problems (ILLCAAP, headed by Anita Bedell),
and J-Journey (a charity headed by Jim and Barbara Esworthy)'
Having lost his daughters Jennifer (age twenty-two) and Jackie (age
eighteen) to a drunk driver, Jim Esworthy detailed to the Illinois
Gaming Board the negative consequences and additional drunk driving
accidents that could be anticipated from extending the hours of operation
for the casino super-bars.5 8 The 1997 Esworthy tragedy prompted
Illinois to lower the blood alcohol level required for proving drunk
driving from .10 to .08, as well as to enact one of the strongest drunk
Mr. Esworthy's
driving statutes in the United States in 1998.'

153. Intoxicated GamblersLosses, supra note 151, at 241 n.9 (citingM. KALLICK, ET AL.
A SURVEY OF AMERICAN GAMBLING ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR 71, 73 (1979) [hereinafter
AMERICAN GAMBLING BEHAVIOR]).
154. AMERICAN GAMBLING BEHAVIOR, supra note 153, at 73, cited in Intoxicated
Gamblers Losses, supra note 151, at 241 n.9.
155. IntoxicatedGamblersLosses, supra note 151, at 241; see also AMERICAN GAMBLING
BEHAVIOR, supra note 153, at 73-74.
156. See Jim Esworthy, Remarks to the Illinois Gaming Board (Oct. 26, 1999)
[hereinafter Jim Esworthy Presentation Stopping Casinos' Alcohol Expansion Plan]; see
also Jim Esworthy, Don't Permit24-hour Casino Gambling, NEws-GAZErE (Champaign,
IL), Nov. 14, 1999, at B3.
157. Jim Esworthy Presentation Stopping Casinos' Alcohol Expansion Plan, supra
note 156.
158. Id.
159. See 625 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-500 (West 2002), amended by P.A. 90-43, § 5
(1997) and P.A. 90-779, § 5 (1999) (driving while intoxicated, transporting alcoholic liquor,
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testimony, in particular, prompted the Board to reject the casinos'
extension requests for the serving of alcohol.16 °
C. Gambling Losses Linked to Complimentary "Comped"Alcohol to
the Loser
Like a bar under dram shop auspices, the question arose whether a
gambling facility had a duty to cut off drunk customers. If while driving
away from the casino, the drunk customer injured someone or something, the casino would presumably be liable under dram shop legal
principles.' 6 ' If, while drunk at the casino, the drunk customer injures
his company, his family, or himself by gambling irresponsibly, an
extrapolation of dram shop principles would theoretically hold the casino
liable for the amounts lost once the patron should have been cut
off-and particularly if the casino continued to take advantage of the
patron's inebriated condition by continuing to provide complimentary
alcohol. "The casinos countered that dramshop liability is based on the
proven effect drinking has on driving. If sober gamblers also lose
regularly, the casinos said, it's impossible to attribute gambling losses
to booze."' 62 On a tactical level, Law Professor I. Nelson Rose has
predicted the trend toward mega-lawsuits against the gambling facilities
themselves.
"Casinos are in the same position today that bars were in 40 years
ago-the big lawsuits are just waiting to happen. No bar owner today
would allow a drunk to be served alcohol, yet casino owners allow
gamblers who are obviously out of control to continue to bet," said
Rose. 163
In a 1989 case, GNOC Corp. v. Aboud,' Shmuel Aboud brought an
action against a casino owned by Golden Nugget, Inc. as successor to
Mirage Resorts, Inc., because he lost $250,000 while the casino's
employees kept feeding him free alcohol although he was obviously
already inebriated." 5 In denying summary judgment for the casino,

and reckless driving); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-501 (West 2002) (driving while under
the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, intoxicating compound or compounds or any
combination thereof).
160. Jim Esworthy Presentation Stopping Casinos' Alcohol Expansion Plan, supra
note 156; see generally Casinos Drop Request for 24-hour Gaming, NEWS-GAZETTE
(Champaign, IL), Dec. 8, 1999, at B2.
161. Casinos Free Drinks Tragic Toll, supra note 151, at Al.
162. Flush With Suits, supra note 83.
163. Stakes Rise, supra note 99, at 16.
164. 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1989).
165. Id. at 646.
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a United States District Court in New Jersey held that the relevant
point was "whether a gambler comprehends the consequences of
continued protracted gambling"16 and that "a casino has a duty to
refrain from knowingly permitting an invitee to gamble where that
patron is obviously and visibly intoxicated ... ."167 The arguments
went to the jury, but thereafter, Aboud lost his case on appeal
to the
16
U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals in a close 2-1 decision. 1
In the early 1990s, Leonard Tose, owner of the Philadelphia Eagles
football team, lost the team after losing $50 million in New Jersey
casinos, including $3 million at the Sands Casino owned by Hollywood
Casino Corp.169 Although Tose demonstrated that the casino employees supplied him with alcohol, Tose lost his series of actions, Tose v.
Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc. 170 in 1993, and Greate Bay Hotel &
Casino v. Tose 17 1 in 1994.
In a subsequent and similar lawsuit, Hakimoglu v. Thump Taj Mahal
Ass'n,'1 72 Ayhan Hakimoglu, chairman of the Aydin Corp., "sued the
Trump Taj Mahal and Caesar's Atlantic City Hotel-Casino to block the
1 73
collection of an $8 million debt, claiming the casino got him drunk."
Consolidating the claims in the complaint
under a single theory of dram
174
shop liability, Hakimoglu lost his case.
It should be noted, however, that these cases were decided in venues
where progambling interests have exercised protracted influence over
common-law precedents impacting on gambling issues. These types of
cases could be decided differently in those jurisdictions where gambling
activities were more recently decriminalized.

166. Id. at 655; see Flush With Suits, supra note 83.
167. 715 F. Supp. at 655. For a subsequent precedent, see Miller v. Zoby, 595 A.2d
1104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), cert. denied, 606 A.2d 366 (1991).
168. Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal, Inc., 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995) cited to GNOC
v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1993) and Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel, 819 F. Supp. 1312
(D.N.J. 1993) to "predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not permit recovery"
of losses by an intoxicated gambler. 70 F.3d 291, 293-94. This cursory four-page, 2-1
opinion of the Third Circuit was followed by an insightful dissent by Judge Becker who
concluded "that the New Jersey Supreme Court would recognize a cause of action, in tort,
allowing patrons to recover gambling debts from casinos that serve them alcohol after they
are visibly intoxicated." Id. at 294.
169. Laurence Arnold, Telling of $50M Losses, Ex-Eagles OwnerRocks GamblingPanel,
THE RECORD (N.J.), July 1, 1999, at L7; see Flush With Suits, supra note 83.
170. 819 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1993).
171. 34 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1994).
172. 876 F. Supp. 625 (D.N.J. 1994), affd, 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995).
173. Flush With Suits, supra note 83.
174. 70 F.3d at 304. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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With regard to the frequency of drunk driving accidents involving
gambling facilities, forensic expert Fred Del Marva claimed he received
175
an average of one call per day and summarized the alcohol problem.
"On a daily basis, someone will call me with this scenario: Someone
goes into a casino, drinks, half an hour later, crosses over into the
oncoming lane and kills someone," said Del Marva. "Although nobody
will ever do a study proving that alcohol is provided at no cost to lower
people's inhibitions to make them game and bet differently, in my
opinion, that's what happens. Free alcohol is served to lower inhibitions and increase irrational thinking. I have videotapes of stings,
where76 our investigators were served an enormous amount of alcohol."1
Since the thousands of surveillance cameras and devices in casinos can
track each chip, a fortiori they can count each customer's drinks-and
cut the customer off. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, these
types of alcohol-gambling cases were becoming more frequent.

V. TRENDS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS
A.

Trends in Civil Lawsuits
1.

Sexual Harassment Cases

One of the most famous sexual harassment cases resulted from
incidents during a 1991 "Tailhook" Convention for military personnel at
the Hilton Hotel and Casino complex in Las Vegas, Nevada.'
Female
officers were allegedly molested or harassed during the Convention.
Former Navy Lieutenant Paula Coughlin sued the Las Vegas Hilton and
was initially awarded $5.2 million. 178 The specifics of this case are
beyond the scope of the present analysis. However, this case was famous
for illustrating that in Nevada, the laws and legal principles governing
the rest of the country might appear to apply, but de facto did not
apply-an interpretation given by Nevada State Senator Bob Coffin. 7 9

175. Casino-RelatedLitigation, supra note 42.
176. Id. at 24.

177. Ed Vogel, Senate Approves Bill That Would Limit Hotel Liability,LAS VEGAS REV.
J., June 3, 1995, at Al, A3.
178. Id.
179. See id.
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In the Tailhook case, the hotel lost, but the Nevada Resort Association
(NRA) was brazen enough to try to eliminate the $5.2 million judgment
and similar future judgments by asking the Nevada legislature for
special legislation making the defendant hotel and gambling companies
18
practically immune from the collection of the plaintiff's judgment. 1
According to Nevada State Senator Neal, who resisted pressure from his
largest hotel client to "vote right,"'8 ' the 15-2 vote approving the bill
"says to the people of the nation that we are not in control here, that any
time a large hotel has a problem (it can) come to the Legislature
and we
183
will fix it ...

.,,182

He concluded, "That is corruption."

Generic concerns involving alcohol in gambling facilities also faced the
gambling industry. For example:
The prevalence of alcohol in the industry has also prompted a rise in
sexual harassment cases, according to Joseph Kelly, an expert on
gaming law and a defense attorney for casinos. "A casino orders a
cocktail waitress to wear a skimpy outfit, a patron puts his hands
where he shouldn't, and the waitress complains," said Kelly. "The pit
boss says, too bad, the guy's a big player and to keep serving. These
kinds of cases are on the rise."8 4
In several casinos, the issue of sexual harassment has surfaced in the
form of lawsuits. In one 1998 case, seven women claimed that while at
work they "endured inappropriate suggestions and touching."' 85 The
lawsuit sought class action status against three casino boats: The
Empress Casino in Hammond, Indiana; the Trump Casino in Gary,
Indiana; and Harrah's Casino in Joliet, Illinois. Plaintiffs sought back
pay and unspecified damages. 186 Carey Stein, the Chicago attorney
representing the seven women, stated that the alleged sexual "harassment came from the employees' managers."8 7 All seven women came
separately to Stein with similar stories about harassment and how they
all "took their complaints to management and were ignored.""8 8

180. Id.
181. Id. at Al.
182.

Id.

183. Id.; see also Memorandum from Michelle L. Erb, Research Assistant Nevada
Legislative Counsel Bureau (Aug. 2, 1995), news attachments (on file with author).
184. Casino-RelatedLitigation, supra note 42, at 24 (quoting Joseph Kelly).
185. FormerDealers,Waitresses sue 3 FloatingCasinosfor Sex Harassment,RoCKFORD
REGISTER STAR (Rockford, IL), July 18, 1998, at A5.
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting Carey Stein).
188. Id. (quoting Carey Stein).
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In a different scenario, it was reported in 2001 to the New Jersey
Attorney General's office that "men in the surveillance department at
Caesars Atlantic City regularly focused cameras on the bodies of women
in revealing clothing."'8 9 According to one source:
Those images were then displayed on banks of surveillance monitors
in full view of all employees of the surveillance department, to a chorus
of "obscene
language and sexually explicit comments," the complaint
190
said.
Two female surveillance employees who complained about being
forced to sit and watch "sexually explicit camera angles" were
subsequently fired ...[according to] 0. Lisa Dabreu, the Director of
the State Division on Civil Rights, who filed the complaint.' 9'
These types of sexual harrassment lawsuits were expected to increase
during the twenty-first century, as public knowledge of these scenarios
increased and as government-sanctioned gambling opportunities also
increased.
2.

Casino DiscriminationCases: Class Action Status

A casino discrimination suit was granted class action status in
1998.192 The case originated in September 1997 when several black
former and current table-game employees for Station Casino in
St. Charles, Missouri, alleged "that they were discriminated against in
employment and advancement and subjected to unequal disciplinary
actions."1 9 To qualify as a class action, plaintiffs had to identify "more
than 25 such employees who allegedly suffered discrimination in
discipline, promotions or terminations."'9 4 However, before proceeding
on the class action basis, this case necessitated a determination of
whether the casino was "liable for discriminatory practices."'95 If the
casino could be found liable, the judge would decide whether the case
could be certified as a class action suit.' 96 Regardless of the eventual
outcome in this case, it exemplified that similar class actions were
feasible and that more such cases could be expected in the future.

189. Complaint Cites Casino Surveillance Cameras, BELLEVILLE NEwS-DEMOCRAT
(Belleville, IL) (reprinted from PhiladelphiaInquirer), Aug. 22, 2001, at A8.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Fred Faust, Casino Bias Suit Granted Class-Action Status, ST. Louis POST
DISPATCH, Dec. 12, 1998, at OT33.
193.

Id.

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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3. Discovery Issues Involving Casino Injuries
The need for plaintiffs' attorneys to act quickly and utilize wideranging discovery techniques was highlighted in 1997, when some
required casino reports to federal authorities had multiple discrepancies.
Due to apparent differences in the way many casinos report on-board
injuries, the Coast Guard investigated several Illinois casinos in
1997.97 Although required to be reported by the casino, by 1997 "the
Coast Guard [still] had no record of 37 injuries that resulted in personal
injury lawsuits against the ...

[Casino Queen] filed in the St. Clair

County courthouse since 1993. " 198 Furthermore, the "Coast Guard also
had no record of the alleged injuries that led to 26 negligence lawsuits
filed in the Madison County courthouse against the Alton Belle since
1991. " 199 The Alton Belle had only reported seven other injuries to the

Coast Guard. °° With each violation of not informing the Coast Guard
about an injury within five days, a fine of up to $25,000 could be
imposed. 20 1 The casino representatives claimed that they were "in
compliance with federal law and that their vessels . . . [were] safe."20 2

The Coast Guard had the authority retroactively to fine the casinos for
the violations,2 3 but even $25,000 fines were essentially meaningless
because
the average casino took in customer losses of over $1 million per
20 4
day.

197. Mike Fitzgerald, Coast Guardto Query CasinoOwnersAbout Injuries, BELLEVILLE
NEWS-DEMOCRAT (Belleville, IL), Dec. 29, 1997, at B1 [hereinafter Coast Guard to Query
Casino Owners]; see also Mike Fitzgerald, Are Riverboat Casinos UnderreportingSerious
Injuriesthat Occur on Board?,BELLEVILLE NEws-DEMOCRAT (Belleville, IL), Dec. 14, 1997,
at B1.
198. Coast Guard to Query Casino Owners, supra note 197.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., ILLINOIS GAMING BOARD, MONTHLY RIVERBOAT CASINO REPORT (Jan.
2002). See generally John W. Kindt, The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry
Effectively: Incentives for Perpetual Non-Compliance, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 221 (2003)
[hereinafter GamblingIndustry PerpetualNon-Compliance];Follow the Money, supra note
10.
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Second Hand Smoke Litigation: "Nowhere to Hide"0 5

In 2000 the Empress Casino in Hammond, Indiana was faced with a
lawsuit which "could have wide-reaching implications for the way ...
casinos deal with the problem of secondhand smoke."2 °6 The case
involved casino employees seeking damages for "dangerous levels of
smoke" at the casino riverboat in Hammond, which was operated by
Joliet-based Horseshoe Gaming Corporation.0 7
The current and former employees who were party to the suit claimed
"that company policy prohibited them from requesting to work in a
nonsmoking area."08
Furthermore, they claimed that "while the
Empress had a ventilation system, it was not adequate to clear the boat
of secondhand smoke." 20 9 In addition to unspecified monetary damages, the employees wanted "the company to improve the poor air quality
in the casino."210 Because the casino was a riverboat, the employees
used "the Jones Act,[ 211] a federal law regulating working conditions
for seamen and railway employees,"21 2 which allowed "seamen to seek
damages for personal injuries from their employers."2 13
5.

The Issue of Religious Discrimination

Accompanying the spread of legalized gambling facilities during the
1990s were concerns involving potential lawsuits predicated upon claims
of religious discrimination. 2 4
For example, Barbara Young was
allegedly fired from the Quad-City Times newspaper in Illinois "for
refusing on religious grounds to sell advertising to riverboat casinos and
taverns."21 5 For three years, Young worked for the newspaper as a
co-op advertising specialist. 216
In August 1998 she was asked to

205. Patricia Richardson, Suit Casts a Haze Over Casino Boats, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus.,
Dec. 4, 2000, at 4, 53 [hereinafter Haze Over Casino].
206. Id. at 53.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982). For an analysis of liability issues under the Jones Act, see
Richard McLaughlin, FloatingCasinos, PersonalInjury and Death Claims, and Admiralty
Jurisdiction,64 Miss. L.J. 439 (1995).
212. Haze Over Casino, supra note 205.
213. 46 U.S.C. § 688.
214. See William Petroski, Woman Objects to Ads, Is Fired, DES MOINES REGISTER,
Jan. 26, 1999, at Mi.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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assume more duties, which included "selling advertisements to churches
and for the 'Go' entertainment page."217 The conflict came with the
"'Go' entertainment page, which feature[d] ads for casinos and taverns."2 1 For religious reasons, she felt inclined not to promote gambling and alcoholic beverages.2 19 When Young gave a "written statement from her church pastor that further explained her religious
convictions" 220 to the newspaper, "Young's boss refused to accommodate
her, claiming that Young supported the sale of alcoholic beverages by
"
' Represented by Davenport attorney Marlifa
dining in restaurants."22
Greve, Young filed complaints with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission
and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.222
6. Premises Liability: A Case that Sticks
Premises liability covers a wide range of scenarios, and the high
profile of gambling facilities combined with their poor social image may
make them more vulnerable than other establishments to causes of
action based on premises liability.223 In one example in 1995, a
Star Casino was forced to escort a patron
security guard in the Silver
"waddling like a duck"224 out of the casino because the gambler had
225
gotten "stuck to a toilet seat that had been smeared with glue."
This situation resulted in the gambler being escorted out of the casino
"with nothing more than a towel covering his predicament." 221 This
incident of humiliation and premises liability resulted in a $50,000
lawsuit against Boyd Gaming Corporation filed on July 14, 1998.27
Premises liability could become almost a pro forma cause of action in
various cases involving casinos, including cases involving the losses
incurred by a gambler.228

217. Id. at M6.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Gambler Sues After Toilet-Glue Incident, ROcKFoRD REGISTER STAR
(Rockford, IL), July 18, 1998, at A9.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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B. The "Comprehensive Gambling Impact Statement" as the Sine Qua
Non Socioeconomic Requirement of the "Environmental Impact Statement": The Trend in Cases
1. Gambling Development Projects: The Essential "Comprehensive
Gambling Impact Statement" Component to the "Environmental
Impact Statement" or the "EnvironmentalAssessment"
Economic development issues invariably interface with the environ229
ment, so the need for an environmental impact statement (EIS)

under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)23 ° becomes
relevant when a proposed gambling facility is large enough to affect
significantly the human environment. In fact the socioeconomic impacts
of legalized gambling activities on their feeder markets (35-mile radius
around typical casinos) are disproportionate and also affect interstate
commerce. Compared to a nongambling development requiring the same
dollar investment (such as a large shopping mall), gambling facilities
have a significantly greater impact because they allegedly cater to and
create an addicted, or potentially addicted, gambling market.2 1' A
fortiori, proposed gambling facilities, particularly tribal facilities, fall
into the category of a major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment. 2
Too often during the 1990s, there was avoidance of meaningful EISs
by federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA),'3 3
analyzing tribal gambling proposals and the U.S. Corps of Engineers
(COE),234 analyzing riverboat gambling proposals. Regarding gambling
proposals, these federal agencies commonly opted to issue a "finding of
no significant impact" (FONSI) 23- pursuant to NEPA, which obviated
the EIS requirements. Before issuing a FONSI or an EIS, the EPA
required the filing of an "environmental assessment" (EA); a public
Agency (EPA)
document required to assist the Environmental Protection
36
in determining whether a full-scale EIS was necessary.
237
Furthermore, one recommendation contained in the Final Report
of the 1996-1999 Commission concluded that a "comprehensive gambling
229. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2002).
230. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-32 (2000).
231. See Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 2, at 25, Table 1.
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2002).
233. Often a fee-to-trust application was involved under the Indian Reorganization Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 461-463 (2000).
234. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
235. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2002); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2002).
236. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (2002).
237. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 3-19, recommendation 3.18.
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impact statement" (CGIS) should be required before legalizing or
authorizing any proposals to expand gambling.23 Therefore, a comprehensive economic impact statement should necessarily be required before
any tribal gambling activities are allowed, and any major gambling
facilities that did not comply with this requirement have been and
continue to be in violation of NEPA and other federal restrictions since
the inception of those gambling facilities. Tribal and nontribal gambling
operations would definitely fall under a CGIS requirement.
Specifically, the 1996-1999 Commission recommended that:
jurisdictions considering the introduction of new forms of gambling or
the significant expansion of existing gambling operations should
sponsor comprehensive gambling impact statements. Such analyses
should be conducted by qualified independent research organizations
and should encompass, in so far as possible, the economic, social, and
regional effects of the proposed action." 9
The very tenor of this pointed recommendation highlights the importance the Commission attributed to it. Furthermore, the Commission
unanimously recommended a moratorium on the expansion of any type
of gambling anywhere in the United States.24 °

238. Id.
239. Id. For the comparisons between expanded gambling and drug abuse, see
Statement of Prof. John Warren Kindt, Univ. of Ill., to the National Gambling Impact
Study Commission, "U.S. and International Concerns over the Socio-Economic Costs of
Legalized Gambling: Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem?," Chicago, IL, May 21, 1998.
These costs tables were subsequently published in Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 2.
For a summary of increased addicted gambling, particularly as the youth rates are twice
as large in the adult population, see John W. Kindt & Thomas Asmar, College and Amateur
Sports Gambling: Gambling Away Our Youth?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221 (2002).
For analyses of the increased bankruptcies caused by the spread of gambling, see John W.
Kindt & John K. Palchak, Legalized Gambling's Destabilization of U.S. Financial
Institutions and the Banking Industry: Issues in Bankruptcy, Credit, and Social Norm
Production, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 21 (2002). For analyses of the increased crime caused by
the spread of gambling, see John W. Kindt, Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling
Operations: The Impact on the Socio-Economics of Business and Government, 30 CRIM. L.
BULL.538 (1994) [hereinafter IncreasedCrime and Legalizing Gambling]. For analyses of
the increased taxes caused by the spread of gambling, see John W. Kindt, Legalized
Gambling Activities as Subsidized by Taxpayers, 48 ARK. L. REV. 889 (1995). For a
strategic overview of gambling issues as they interface with E-Business, see John W. Kindt
& Stephen W. Joy, InternetGamblingand the Destabilizationof National and International
Economies: Time for a Comprehensive Ban on Gambling Over the World Wide Web, 80
DENV. U. L. REV. 111 (2002). Several of these analyses, published before the 1999 U.S.
National Commission completed its report are referenced in the Final Report. NGISC
FINAL REPORT, supra note 68, App. IV.
240. Id. at introduction by Chair Kay C. James. See alsoAddress by Richard C. Leone,
former Commissioner, 1996-1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission, to the

2004]

GAMBLING LAWSUITS

565

2. The U.S. Departmentof Interior,the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
and Comprehensive Gambling Impact Statements: Gambling with the
White Buffalo's Environment?
Under the 1988 Indian Gambling Regulatory Act (IGRA), 241 the
pursuit of expanded Native American gambling resulted in a plethora of
cases during the 1990s. Prodded by the enormous profits in Native
American gambling and by visions of sovereign independence, numerous
test cases were filed by tribal gambling interests to expand gambling.
Perhaps unexpectedly, Native American gambling interests lost one
test case in 2003, Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake SuperiorChippewa
Indians of Wisconsin v. United States.242 This case began on May 11,
2001, when Wisconsin Governor Scott McCallum filed a notice of
nonconcurrence with the U.S. Secretary of the Interior's determination
on February 20, 2001, that applicant Chippewa tribes could "conduct
gaming on lands to be acquired in trust [i.e., after-acquired property]...
and [that the gaming] would not be detrimental to the surrounding
community."2' The tribe's gambling interests then filed suit challenging the IGRA requirement of "gubernatorial concurrence," claiming it
was unconstitutional. 2 "
An amicus curiae brief opposing the tribal claims and supporting the
Wisconsin governor was filed by twenty-one states.2 45 While not
specifically an issue in Chippewa, the determination by the Secretary of
the Interior that the gaming "would not be detrimental to the surround-

Annual Conference of the National Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, Baltimore, MD
& Washington, DC, Sept. 25-26, 2003. The nine commissioners voted unanimously for a
moratorium on the expansion of any type of gambling in the United States. Casino
lobbyists were outraged by the vote, and they voiced objections to those commissioners who
worked for the gambling industry. John W. Kindt, U.S. NationalSecurity and the Strategic
EconomicBase: The Business/Economic Impacts of the Legalizationof GamblingActivities,
39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 567 (1995) (urging a moratorium on expanded gambling in 1995).
241. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2000) [hereinafter IGRA]. The IGRA was enacted to
regulate tribal gambling after gambling interests won their test case and opened the door
to widespread tribal gambling. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S.
202 (1987).
242. 259 F. Supp. 2d 783 (W.D. Wis. 2003); see Opinion and Order, Chippewa v.
Wisconsin, No. 02-C-0553-C (W.D. Wis. 2003) [hereinafter Chippewa v. Wisconsin Opinion
and Order].
243. Chippewa v. Wisconsin Opinion and Order, supra note 242, at 5-6; see also IGRA,
25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2000).
244. Chippewa v. Wisconsin Opinion and Order, supra note 242.
245. See id. at 4.
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ing community"24 6 reveals the Interior Department's negligent disregard, or even ignorance, of the basic socioeconomic principles of
gambling: Gambling activities are almost invariably detrimental to the
surrounding community (which gambling marketers designate the feeder
market).24
Importantly, the Department of Interior apparently
neither considered nor referenced the nationally authoritative and
relevant study on precisely this issue: The Economic Impact of Native
American Gaming in Wisconsin.24 8 While the shadow issue of "economic detriment," and the perceived need for a CGIS, pervade the arguments
in Chippewa,249 the case was decided primarily on the gubernatorial
nonconcurrence provision, and the court held that it was constitutional
despite the tribal arguments.2 5 °
In a similar case, the EA prepared in February 2002 for the proposed
Huron Band-Potawatomi casino in Calhoun County, Michigan, 251 did
not even mention the significant academic literature relating to the
socioeconomic cost to benefit ratio of 3:1 in the gambling facilities feeder
markets.252 Therefore, the FONSI issued July 31, 2002, by the
Department of Interior should not have been issued on both procedural

246. Id. at 6. Contra John W. Kindt, The Negative Impacts of Legalized Gambling on
Businesses, 4 U. MIAMI Bus. L.J. 93 (1994); John W. Kindt, Legalized GamblingActivities:
The Issues Involving Market Saturation, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 271 (1995); John W. Kindt,
Introducing Casino-Style Gambling into Pre-existingEconomies: A Summary of Impacts
on Tourism, Restaurants, Hotels, and Small Businesses, 10 N. ARIZ. U. H. RESEARCH &
RESOURCE CTR. 6 (1996).
247. For a summary of these issues, see Kindt, Crime Multiplier, supra note 61.
248. WILLIAM THOMPSON ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NATIVE AMERICAN GAMING
IN WISCONSIN (Wis. Policy Research Inst. 1995) [hereinafter WiS. POLICY RESEARCH INST.].
249. See generally Chippewa v. Wisconsin Opinion and Order, supra note 242, at 3-6.
250. Id. at 35.
251. EDAW, Inc., Environmental Assessment:
Nottawaseppi Huron Band of
Potawatomi Indians: Calhoun County Gaming Facility (Feb. 2002).
252. The NationalImpact of Casino GamblingProliferation:Hearing before the House
Comm. on Small Business, 103d Cong. 77-81 & nn.9, 12 (1994); John W. Kindt, The
Business-Economic Impacts of Licensed Casino Gambling in West Virginia: Short-Term
Gain but Long-Term Pain, 13 W. VA. U. PuB. AFF. REP. 22 (1996). For a summary of
studies, see Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard, Business Profitability versus Social
Profitability: Evaluating Industries with Externalities, The Case of Casinos, 22
MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. 143, 153 (2001) thereinafter The Case of Casinos]; see Earl L.
Grinols, et al. Casinos and Crime (1999) (unpublished draft on file with author, forthcoming
as Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard, The Curious Case of Casinos and Crime, __ REV.
ECON. & STAT. _ (2003); see also Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard, Management &
Information Issues for Industries with Externalities: The Case of Casino Gambling, 22
MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. 1 (2001). For the definitive book in these issue areas, see EARL
L. GRINOLS, GAMBLING IN AMERICA: COSTS AND BENEFITS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004).
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and substantive grounds.253 Primarily focusing on other issues, the
Citizens Exposing Truth About Casinos (CETAC), a Michigan nonprofit
corporation, filed a lawsuit challenging the Department of Interior's
decision-making processes.2 " However, the economic detriment issues
and the perceived need for a CGIS still shadowed this case.
In 2003 in TOMAC v. Norton25 5 the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia finally overruled a BIA's environmental
assessment and concomitant FONSI 6 Importantly, the court ruled
that "[t]here is a certain common sense appeal to TOMAC's argument
that a 24-hour-a-day casino attracting 12,500 visitors per day to a
community of 4,600 residents cannot help but have a significant impact
on that community."257 The BIA was ordered to consider and analyze
"secondary growth issues" 258 with the court not deciding "whether
BIA's decisionmaking process was rational based on the conclusory
statements in the record about the extensive growth-inducing effects of
the casino."259 The case was remanded to the BIA to substantiate its
conclusions and analysis regarding the secondary (feeder market) growth
issues for the proposed casino.26 °
3. The U.S. Corps of Engineers (COE) and Comprehensive
Gambling Impact Statements: Missing the Boat?
One proposed gambling riverboat in Harrison County, Indiana,
exemplifies the COE interface with such proposals during the 1990s.
Many of these proposed gambling projects had embarrassingly sparse
EAs used to justify the issuance of related FONSIs exempting the
projects from full-scale EIS requirements. The proposed gambling

253. Neal A. McCaleb, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't Interior (July
31, 2002) (Proposed Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi Indians Gaming Facility In
Emmett Township, Michigan: Finding of No Significant Impact).
254. Complaint, CETAC v.Norton, No. 1:02CF01754-TPJ (D.D.C. 2002).
255. 240 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2003); see also Memorandum & Order, TOMAC v.
Norton, No. 01-0398 (JR) (D.D.C. 2003) [hereinafter TOMAC v. Norton, Memorandum &
Order].
256. TOMAC v. Norton, Memorandum & Order, supra note 255, at 15.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 16.
259. Id. The court cited to two cases: Friendsof the Earth, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 109 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38 (D.D.C. 2000) (remanding for further analysis of
proposed casino projects where the record included conclusory statements but no actual
analysis of impacts); Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (each case must be
subject to a "particularized analysis" considering the nature of the violations and any
countervailing considerations of the public interest), vacated in partas moot, 439 U.S. 992
(1978).
260. TOMAC v. Norton, Memorandum & Order, supra note 255, at 15-16.
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riverboat project for Bridgeport in Harrison County had a fairly lengthy
EA26' compared with similar projects-although skeptics would argue
that the more lengthy EA was due to well-organized public opposition to
the project. In the Bridgeport proposal, the COE issued a FONSI, which
was both procedurally and substantively remiss, because the FONSI
ignored the academic literature and studies quantifying the 3:1 cost to
benefit ratio262 in the gambling facilities' self-identified feeder markets.263 Critics also noted that progambling interests would necessarily want to sidestep the 3:1 cost to benefit issues, because almost all
gambling proposals would fail the cost to benefit test.
C. Since 1994 All FederalAgency Decisions Which Have Not
Addressed Gambling's Socioeconomic Costs of $3 for Every $1 in
Benefits Fail Procedurally: Any Decisions Which Have Not Addressed
the 3:1 Ratio Fail on the Merits
Even prior to 1994, the gambling industry's directly and indirectly
sponsored studies revealed that the socioeconomic costs of new gambling
facilities were $3 for every $1 in benefits in the feeder markets.2"
Despite being attacked by industry lobbyists, the academic studies,
including the 1995 Wisconsin study,265 continued to cluster around the
3:1 ratio throughout the 1990s, and the ratio was reconfirmed in
200126 and 2003.267 Nevertheless, it appeared that there was not
a single federal agency since the 1970s which had reviewed, considered,
or analyzed the 3:1 ratio in EAs, FONSIs, or EISs. Accordingly, since
the 1970s all proposals for expanded gambling, which had federal agency
involvement, should be reviewed for procedural failure as well as
substantive failures (on their merits).
D.

TRends in the Politicaland Governmental Environments

The fast-shuffle tactics often utilized by progambling interests and
their noncompliance with state constitutional provisions were highlight-

261. See U.S. Corps of Engineers, Environmental Assessment, Statement of Findings
(Col. Harry L. Spear) 1998; Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Corps of
Engineers Issues Gaming Boat Permit (Feb. 10, 1998) (on file with Corps of Engineers).
262. The Case of Casinos,supra note 252, at 153.
263. See Crime Multiplier,supra note 61, app. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 61-64, 252 and accompanying text; see also Crime Multiplier,
supra note 61, app.
265. WIS. POLICY RESEARCH INST., supra note 248.
266. The Case of Casinos, supra note 252, at 153.
267. See generally Earl L. Grinols, Comment, MANAGERIAL & DEC. ECON. (2003)
(forthcoming). See supra notes 61-64, 252, and accompanying text.
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ed by the unconstitutional gambling legislation passed in New York
concomitant to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center.2" Even
absent such a national tragedy as a public relations tool, progambling
interests historically evidenced little respect for pre-existing legislative
restraints and constitutional safeguards.
These problems were
illustrated in Indiana during a 1993 special session of the Indiana
General Assembly, which was convened by Governor Evan Bayh (D) to
pass the 1994-1995 biannual budget. As in previous sessions, proposals
were initiated to authorize casino gambling on riverboats. A riverboat
gambling bill had failed on its merits during the regular session, but
during the special session it "was attached as an amendment to the
budget bill during a conference committee."2 69 This logrolled bill
passed both houses of the General Assembly. Although it was vetoed by
Governor Bayh, the General Assembly repassed the budget bill, and it
became law. ° Thus, the gambling riverboat bill was codified via a
procedural maneuver rather than a debate on its merits.2 '
In 1998 Indiana citizens challenged the constitutionality of the
riverboat gambling act, in Schulz, Phillips, & Becker v. Indiana.2
However, because he had served as a former Indiana gambling regulator,
one Indiana Supreme Court Justice had to recuse himself from the vote
on the petition to transfer the case. 273 A tie resulted, which had the
practical effect of denying the majority needed to grant the petition to
transfer 2 7 ' and thereby once again procedural issues exempted the
gambling riverboat legislation from a scrutiny of substantive issues.

268. See John W. Kindt, Would Re-Criminalizing U.S. Gambling Pump-Prime the
Economy and Could U.S. GamblingFacilitiesBe Transformed into Educationaland HighTech Facilities?,8 STANFORD J. L., Bus. & FIN. 169 (2003) [hereinafter Gambling Facilities
Transformed into Educational Facilities]; see also John W. Kindt & Anne E. C. Brynn,
DestructiveEconomic Policies in the Age of Terrorism: Government-SanctionedGambling
as Encouraging Transboundary Economic Raiding and Destabilizing National and
InternationalEconomies, 16 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 243 (2002); John W. Kindt,
Internationally,The 21st Century Is No Time for the United States to be GamblingWith the
Economy: Taxpayers Subsidizing the Gambling Industry and the De Facto Elimination of
All Casino Tax Revenues via the 2002 Economic Stimulus Act, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 363
(2003).
269. Amended Complaint, Schulz, Phillips,& Becker v. Indiana,No. 31CO1-9610-CP-214 (C.C. Ind. 1998) [hereinafter Schulz Complaint].
270. Id.
271. IND. CODE ANN §§ 4-33-3-1 to 4-33-3-23 (Michie 1996).
272. No. 31CO1-9610-CP-214 (C.C. Ind. 1998); Schulz Complaint, supra note 269.
273. Memorandum from Indianapolis Attorney Richard A. Waples, to Pastor Webster
Oglesby, et al., "Re: Schulz v. Indiana Gaming Commission" (Dec. 12, 2000) (a public
memorandum).
274. Id.; Order, Schulz v. State, No. 31A01-9907-CV-240 (C.C. Ind. 2000).
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During the 1990s, South Carolina served as the most salient
illustration of a state dominated and abused by progambling interests.
In 1985 a gambling provision was slipped past gambling opponents into
South Carolina legislation.2 75 This legislative legerdemain had the net
effect of inviting numerous VGMs into the state. 276 Sacrificing his own
political career as both the governor and a potential vice-presidential
candidate with George W. Bush, South Carolina Governor David Beasley
led the effort to recriminalize and ban these VGMs, and by 2000 the
VGMs were de facto prohibited by state law. 277 Multiple cases involving pathological (i.e. addicted) gamblers yielded multi-million-dollar
judgments against the elusive owners of VGMs2
After South Carolina recriminalized VGMs, many of the machines
were simply moved into other vulnerable states, such as Georgia and
West Virginia, where the VGMs were operated illegally. According to
progambling interests, the way to eliminate illegal gambling and illegal
VGMs is to legalize what is illegal. In 2002 the Georgia legislature
refused to be seduced by this legislative oxymoron and therefore, did not
legalize the illegal VGMs.2 "9 This policy was followed by practically
every other state. However, in West Virginia the illegal VGMs were
methodically and progressively legalized in specialized legislation,
particularly in 2001 when Governor Bob Wise (D) engaged in political
strong-arming.28 0
By 2003 West Virginia had legalized 14,325
VGMs. 2s ' Apparently in violation of the West Virginia Constitution,
the state's "take" or "piece of the action" from its VGMs was specifically
designated for specialized legislative programs.2 2 Citizens' groups,
represented by Jackson County attorney Larry Harless, filed a lawsuit

275. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-19-60 (Law. Co-op 1985) (the words "money or property" were
struck from the statutory ban against distributions from gambling machines via State
Senator Jack Lindsay). For the most comprehensive analysis of court cases related to
pathological gambling's interface with the political, social, and economic environments, see
R. Randall Bridwell & Frank L. Quinn, From Mad Joy to Misfortune: The Merger of Law
and Politics in the World of Gambling, 72 MIss. L.J. 565 (2002) [hereinafter The Merger
of Law and Politics in Gambling].
276. See South Carolina v. Blackmon, 403 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 1991).
277. The Merger of Law and Politics in Gambling,supra note 275, at 590-92.
278. See generally id.
279. Rhonda Cook, U.S. Judge Halts Use of Poker Machines, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
June 26, 2002, at Bi; Bill Ronki & Rhonda Cook, Video Poker Loses Bet on Georgia High
Court, ATLANTA J.-CONsT., May 29, 2002, at Al.
280. W. Va. Governor Moves Ahead with Video-Poker Strategy, ROANOKE TIMES
(Roanoke, VA), May 9, 2001, at A5.
281. Paul J. Nyden, Groups File Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (W. Va.), June 12, 2003, at A12 [hereinafter Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling].
282. Id.
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on June 11, 2003, alleging that the West Virginia lottery was not
properly enforcing existing statutes and VGM regulations and that the
VGMs were an "economic threat" to the state. 28 3 As summarized in
19942' and then subsequently reconfirmed in studies throughout the
following years, 8 5 the socioeconomic costs of new decriminalized
gambling facilities clustered at costs of $3 for every $1 in benefits. 8 6
In venues with loss limits, like the $500 loss limit in place in Missouri
in 2004, these socioeconomic negatives and concomitant crime were less.
However, in states like Illinois with no loss limits the negatives were
proportionally intensified-with increased costs passed to the taxpayers.
In West Virginia, Lewisburg attorney Barry Bruce and the Treasurer of
the Greenbrier County Coalition Against Gambling Expansion Paula
McLaughlin noted that those states with widespread gambling (and
without loss limits), including Nevada," 7 had more budget problems
than those states with less gambling.8 8
The citizens' lawsuit was appealed directly to the West Virginia
Supreme Court. The petition filed by attorney Larry Harless also
alleged that the video poker machine payouts were "'rigged. . .to ensure
that over time, almost all players lose their money."'' 2 9 With regard
to marketing issues, the petition also alleged that the West Virginia
lottery was "violating state law by engaging in illegal 'advertising and
promotional activities to entice and induce persons to gamble, or gamble
more.'" 2 0 As these issues and parallel cases were becoming more
public during the beginning of the twenty-first century, the legal

283. Id.
284. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
285. Id.
286. Id.; see also supra note 239 and accompanying text.
287. In 2003 Nevada's Governor Kenny Guinn stated in his "State of the State" address
that taxes from gambling sources were unreliable and poor fiscal policy. Nev. Gov.Kenny
Guinn, State of the State Address (Jan. 20, 2003). See also supra note 239 and
accompanying text.
288. Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling, supra note 281, at A12. See, e.g., John W.
Kindt, Time to Cut Better Deal with Casinos or Take Them Over, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, June 4,
2003, at 51.
289. Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling,supra note 281, at A12. Compare id., with
Free Credit, supra note 127 (formula for "gambler's ruin").
290. Suit to Shut Down Video Gambling,supra note 281, at A12. On October 17, 2003,
the West Virginia Supreme Court deferred to the political decisions of the legislature and
left in place West Virginia's VGMs. State ex rel. City of Charleston v. W. Va. Econ. Dev.
Auth., 588 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 2003). Justice Starcher's "lament instead of a dissent,"
exemplified the judiciary's distress with the legislature's decisionmaking but declined to
declare it unconstitutional. Id. at 674 (Starcher, J., concurring, but "lamenting").
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discovery in these various cases was causing an increased ripple-effect
throughout the general legal community.
VI.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Recommendation for Uniformity: FederalLegislation Re-Establishing "An Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful
Gaming," The 1710 Statute of Anne2 9'
1.

Gambling's Losers as Queen Anne's Winners
During the 1990s, a number of casino players sued some casinos
claiming "that gambling operators induced them to run up debts by
plying them with drink or feeding their gambling fever with excessive
credit."2 92 The gambling industry did not perceive much vulnerability,
particularly since the major cases were in states like New Jersey and
Nevada, where decades of industry influence had made the state
common law favorable to the interests of the gambling industry. Many
casinos viewed the lawsuits as a way for people not to accept responsibility for their actions or for themselves.
However, some plaintiffs'
attorneys began arguing the legal dram shop principles, which required
"bartenders to cut off drunk patrons" 293 to support their arguments to
hold casinos legally responsible for their patrons.2
With parallels to
lawsuits involving alcohol and credit, "[i]n the end, casino credit
practices may be the industry's legal Achilles' heel." 95 If the courts
were to begin to acknowledge "that credit extended to people who [are
not] in control of themselves ...[did not constitute] a binding contract,
then casinos will have to forgive inveterate losers some huge debts,"296
and the casinos' responsibility for patrons would increase. Of course, the
starting point for any gambling debts owed would be Queen Anne's
Statute of 1710, also known as the Statute of Anne, 297 a common-law
principle holding that anyone who lost money gambling could sue the
winner and receive his money back. Speaking volumes of legal and
social policies is the official title of Queen Anne's Statute, "An Act for the
2 g
Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful Gaming." 1

291. Statute of Anne, 1710, 9 Ann. c. 14 § 1 (Eng.).
292. Flush With Suits, supra note 83.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Statute of Anne, 1710, 9 Ann. c. 14 § 1 (Eng.).
298. Id.
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The Statute of Anne was predicated upon the common knowledge that
gambling activities can"hook" people, destroy their reasonable judgment,
and make them vulnerable to being lured and entrapped into "Excessive
and Deceitful Gaming." These 300-year-old principles of the common
law were misinterpreted and misunderstood by the Seventh Circuit in
Williams when the court merely
dismissed the directed marketing to an
2 99
addicted gambler as "puffery."
For obvious reasons, progambling interests during the 1980s and
thereafter made substantial efforts state-by-state to preempt state
legislation modeled on Queen Anne's Statute so that progambling
interests could directly or indirectly collect gambling debts and keep any
monies lost at their gambling facilities. For example, in South Dakota,
the third state (after Nevada and New Jersey) to allow nontribal casino
gambling in 1988,0 ° the common law still allowed the gambling loser
to recover all monies lost gambling 0 l if the action was brought within
six months.0 2 The electronic gambling devices (EGDs) for casino
gambling in Deadwood, South Dakota, were made specifically exempt as
"authorized gaming" from the principles established by Queen Anne's
Statute." 3 Otherwise, within six months after the losses occurred, the
losers could sue the casino's proprietors as well as any other players and
receive their money back.
By comparison, when casinos came to Missouri in 1991, the courts
were easily accessible because "[amny person who shall lose any money
or property at any game, gambling device or by any bet or wager
whatever may recover the same by a civil action."3 °4 This provision
probably remained unused by Missouri gamblers due to the social stigma
of being "a loser," as well as a lack of knowledge among the general
public.0 5 In South Carolina, however, legalized VGMs between 1991
and 2000306 resulted in multiple applications of Queen Anne's Statute
and associated legal principles, which concluded with many gambling
losers winning their cases.

299.
300.
301.
(Michie

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2003).
See Economic Impacts, supra note 52, at 70-74.
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-6-1 (Michie 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 42-7B-47
1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 53-9-2 (Michie 1990).

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-6-1.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 42-7B-55 (Michie 1991).
MO. ANN. STAT. § 434.030 (West 1992).
See, e.g., Casino-RelatedLitigation, supra note 42, at 17.
The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the referendum banning video

gambling machines as of July 1, 2000, in Joytime Distrib. & Amusement Co. v. State, 528
S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1999).
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Extensions of Credit by Gambling Facilities: Not Recoverable?

2.

If the gambling facility extends credit to
might not be recoverable. For the few in
Queen Anne's Statute, they might find the
scenario. Otherwise the case of Anthony
Company worker, could be illustrative."°7

gamblers, the credit losses
the public educated about
statute applicable to their
Lamonaco, a Walt Disney

In January 1990, Lamonaco ... went on a two-day spree in Atlantic
City and ran up $285,000 in debt at the Sands, Claridge and Bally's
Park Place, owned by Bally Entertainment Corp.
An averred compulsive [addicted] gambler, Lamonaco sued these
casinos for the amount of the debt, saying they repeatedly extended his
credit even though he was "totally out of control," cursing dealers and
smashing ashtrays as his losses mounted.3"8
The New Jersey case went before a state judge who "ruled that the court
couldn't recognize the disorder of compulsive [i.e., pathological]
gambling, in itself, as a defense against paying the debt.""°9 With the
added research available by 2002, the disorder of pathological gambling
was more widely recognized. An example of this increased recognition
was in the Final Report of the 1999 U.S. Gambling Commission. 10
Therefore, this defense would have more weight in the twenty-first
century. Regardless of this issue, the judge ruled that "there was a valid
question as to whether Lamonaco was so distressed by his losses that he
couldn't enter into a legally binding contract."31 ' The casinos settled
for an undisclosed amount-presumably to avoid the chance of setting
precedents inimical to the gambling industry regarding alcohol
consumption as a contractual defense to casinos' credit practices.3 '2
In 1996 experts began to opine in the national press that the extension
of credit by gambling facilities could be uncollectible: "If courts begin to
agree that credit extended to people who [are not] in control of themselves is not a binding contract, then casinos will have to forgive
inveterate losers some huge debts."" 3 Kansas City attorney Steve
Small, who has litigated against casinos, summarized the issues as
follows:

307. Flush With Suits, supra note 83.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 4-1 et seq.; see NGISC ExEc. SUMMARY,
supra note 68, at 16-18.
311. Flush With Suits, supra note 83.
312.

Id.

313. Id.
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"Next is the negligence claim against the casino for allowing the
compulsive [addicted] patron to continue to gamble. That is going to
take some evidence, maybe a letter from a psychiatrist saying, 'Do not
take any more checks from the client because he is an addict.' Where
the casino has good notice, they may have a duty of care similar to that
in the dram shop cases," said Small. He said, "[Tihere are defenses to
gambling losses. Gambling is a contractual behavior and if you are
drunk, you do not have the requisite mental status to make the wager
enforceable," he said. "Or what about contracts void as against public
policy? If gambling debts are not enforceable in Missouri and someone
an ATM, is there a challenge to enforceability of
is advanced money by
314
these transactions?"

These issues become more convoluted when gambling's regulators
recognize that extremely lucrative jobs are waiting for them in the
gambling industry-often without a legislated one-year waiting period,
as was the case in Illinois before 2004.'
More importantly, gamb-

314. Self-Exclusion, supra note 38.
315. See Gambling Industry Perpetual Non-Compliance, supra note 204; see also
Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling, supra note 239. In California, for example,
senior administrators in the attorney general's Division of Gambling Control were accused
by former employees of "routinely quashling] investigations into suspected corruptions,
embezzlement and theft at Indian casinos. .. 'with the result being that millions of dollars
of taxpayer money [was] basically "looted" by corruption in the casinos.'" Onell R. Soto,
Agents say Indian Casino Probes Stymied, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB, Oct. 10, 2003, at Al

[hereinafter Indian CasinoProbes Stymied]. Harlan Goodson, the head of the California
Division of Gambling Control, relinquished his position and went to work for a Las Vegas
law firm. Skeptics highlighted this case as another example of the "revolving door" where
regulators go to work for the gambling industry. Id. (Goodson did not return calls from
the press). In 1996, Harold Monteau, the head of the U.S. National Indian Gaming
Commission was forced out of his position for alleged improprieties. He then took a job
making money from those formerly under his regulatory mandate. Bruce Orwall, Gaming
the System: The Federal Regulator of Indian Gambling is Also PartAdvocate, WALL ST.
J., July 22, 1996, at A9. For discussions of abuses/scandals in these issue areas, see
Gambling FacilitiesTransformed into EducationalFacilities,supra note 268, at 172-76.
By comparison, when Philip C. Parenti the administrator of the Illinois Gaming Board
resigned to accept a position with Harrah's casino company, Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich summarily "fired" him-rather than permit Parenti to collect several weeks
salary. Assoc. Press, Gaming Board May Change Conduct Code, NEws-GAZETrrE
(Champaign, IL) July 19, 2003, at B4. For a classic article on issues/scandals involving the
"revolving door" in the regulation of gambling, see Brett Pulley, From Gambling's
Regulators to Casinos'Men, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1998, at Al. To address the problem of
the regulatory revolving door, the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study Commission
suggested enacting laws providing for a one-year delay before a gambling regulator could
accept a position as a gambling industry employee. This was a common standard in other
industries such as the defense industry. However, states basically ignored this standard,
and thereby gave a free pass to gambling companies. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note
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ling's regulators can be charged with not only regulating a state's
gambling, but also promoting that gambling-while supposedly
administering mandates to keep gambling facilities from admitting
"disassociated persons," i.e., pathological gamblers self-excluded from
those facilities. These types of legislated conflicts-of-interest demonstrate the overbearing legislative power of progambling interests,
operating to the detriment of the public good and common-law ethical
safeguards.
In one 2002-2003 oxymoronic example in Missouri, the legislation
allowed the executive director of the Missouri Gaming Commission
(MGC), Kevin P. Mullally, to sit also on the Board of the National
Center for Reponsibile Gaming (NCRG).316 With multi-million-dollar
backing, the NCRG was funded almost exclusively by progambling
interests 3 v since it was created by the main Washington-based
lobbying group for progambling interests, the American Gaming
Association (AGA). Consequently, the credibility of the MGC itself was
compromised. Furthermore, Mullally could have opted not to accept
such a high-profile position with the NCRG, and by accepting such a
position, he significantly jeopardized his credibility.

68, rec. 3.17, at 3-19.
The "revolving door" incidents in Illinois after the National Commission's 1999 Final
Report exemplified the continuing regulatory problems throughout the United States.
After only a few weeks as an Illinois regulator beginning in 2001,
Thomas F. Swoik quit his job at the Illinois Gaming Board [and] began a part-time
job representing gambling interests as executive director of the Illinois Casino
Gaming Association.
Swoik's career move has enraged gambling opponents and government
watchdogs, who want the Gaming Board to bar such moves.
Assoc. Press, Former Casino Regulator Gets New Job: Move to Gambling Association
Angers Opponents, Watchdogs, STATE J.-REG. (Springfield, IL), Apr. 4, 2002, at All
[hereinafter CasinoRegulatorMoves to Gambling]. The fact that Swoik went to the Illinois
casino "association so quickly after leaving the Gaming Board raise[d] suspicions about
cozy relationships between casinos and board staff." Id. Previously, there had been other
incidents involving the Illinois "revolving door."
Swoik isn't the first person to leave the Gaming Board to work in the industry.
Its first administrator, attorney William Kunkle, has represented several casino
groups, including Emerald Casino Inc., which is fighting to open a casino in
Rosemont. Former acting administrator Joseph McQuaid is Emerald's vice
president. And Donna More, a former board legal counsel, is a regular at board
meetings, representing multiple casinos.
Id.
316. See, e.g., National Center for Responsible Gaming, Annual Report 3 (2002).
317. See id. at 4-5.
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B. Recommendation for Scope: FederalLegislation Prohibiting
Enforcement of Gambling Debts and Allowing Recovery of Losses Plus
Gambling Debts Already Paid for Three Years
The "Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful
Gaming""'8 (Queen Anne's Statute or Statute of Anne) specified that:
(1) gambling debts were unenforceable by the courts; 1 ' (2) losing
gamblers could sue within three months to recover their losses; 20 and
(3) if losing gamblers did not sue within three months, third parties,
such as family or government officials, could sue for treble damages plus
litigation costs. 2
Therefore, it would seem advantageous for third
parties, such as the family members of pathological and problem
gamblers, to explore the possibilities of suing to receive three times the
amount of the losses. If "players cards" or "fun cards" were issued by the
gambling facilities, then the gambler's losses could be more easily
tracked, as they were in Williams v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp. 22
This scenario theoretically means that the only practical defenses
involved marketing to the loser to convince the gambler not to be
dissatisfied at losing and to keep the losses secret from family members
until after the statute of limitations (SOL) of three to six months had
run. As unreasonable and bizarre as this scenario might appear, the
social stigma of "being a loser" appears to be so great, 23 and the denial
phase so intense in pathological and problem gamblers, 24 that they
necessarily destroy their own chances for recovery-both of losses and
of self. The second major impediment to losing gamblers suing for their
losses involved the ignorance of the gambler or the family members
regarding the remedies available under Queen Anne's Statute. This lack
of knowledge could be remedied by the gambler if the gambler or family
members sought legal counsel, but as a practical consequence of the
social stigma phenomenon, the gamblers and involved family would
usually wait too long to seek legal advice.
One solution was to extend the three to six month SOL provisions in
most states to three years. Sociologists indicated that three years was

318. Statue of Anne, 1710, 9 Ann. c. 14 § 1 (Eng.).
319. Id.
320. Id. § 2.
321. Id.
322. Williams Complaint, supra note 92; see Noffsinger Presentation, supra note 47.
323. See, e.g., THE CHASE, supra note 129; Stakes Rise, supra note 99, at 16.
324. Id.
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a reasonable time for pathological and problem gambling situations to
manifest themselves.325
Finally the gaps in the state-by-state Statutes of Anne 32' and the
lack of uniformity called for federal intervention and legislation. This
recommendation was reinforced by the interstate nature of the socioeconomic impacts of pathological and problem gamblers.
C. Recommendation for Clarity: The Judiciary Piercing the Veil of
the Gambling Industry
1.

Avoiding the False Predicatesof Gambling'sPR
During a 1995 U.S. congressional hearing, the false predicates and
consequences of gambling's ubiquitous PR juggernaut were summarized
as follows:
[Liegalized gambling interests are utilizing millions of dollars to
misdirect the debate and cause government decisionmakers and the
public to reach invalid conclusions. First, there is the incorrect
assumption that legalized gambling activities are like other business
activities. Instead, legalized gambling activities have large industryspecific negatives, resulting in a cumulative negative economic impact.
Second, the industry's tendency to focus attention on specialized factors
provides a distorted view of the localized economic positives, while
ignoring the large business-economic costs to different regions of the
United States. Third, the extraordinary amount of money which is
legally used to overwhelm any opposition leads to unbalanced decisionmaking processes by elected officials, regulatory agencies, and even the
court system.327
In the decade since these congressional hearings,
the unbalanced
decisionmaking of elected officials and regulatory agencies in decriminalizing organized gambling increased dramatically. However, particularly

325.

See, e.g., THE CHASE, supra note 129; ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE ADMIN., MD. DEP'T

HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, TASK FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND (1990);

see also DSM-IV, supra note 3, § 312.31, at 617-18.
326. See generally Joseph Kelly, Caught in the Intersection Between Public Policy and
Practicality: A Survey of the Legal Treatment of Gambling-Related Obligations in the
United States, 5 CHAPMAN L. REV. 87 (2002).
327. Nat'l Gambling Impact & Policy Comm'n Act of 1995: Hearingon H.R. 497 before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 519-20 (1995) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted) (statement of Professor John Warren Kindt) [hereinafter Congressional Gambling
Hearing 1995].
328. Id.
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alarming was the increase in cursory reviews and invalid assumptions
to be found in judicial decisions.
Exemplifying these problems were tribal interests being leveraged by
progambling interests to file test cases that were designed to place
gambling facilities in every locale.329 Among the nontribal cases,
Pappas exemplifies the problems faced by the judiciary.
In 1993 the Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency, essentially
the city council of Las Vegas, 30 used eminent domain to take the
Pappas's land allegedly "in less than 50 seconds in a summary proceeding on December 15, 1993 at which they were not even pres6.lt"33 ' nor
previously properly served.332
Finally, in December 2003, Pappaswas appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court." ' The pivotal issue in Pappas was "whether casinos and
topless clubs will be considered 'public use' as defined by the Fifth
Amendment," to the United States Constitution."335 As in Poulos, 336 which was filed in 1994, the 1993 Pappas case had been procedurally delayed for over ten years. 3 7 These problematic cases made
gambling industry litigators vulnerable to claims of utilizing litigation
patterns for delay.
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, the power of eminent domain is
curtailed by the "takings clause" which provides: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation."3 3 8 Prior

329. For an analysis of problematic litigation being fronted by tribal interests, see
SubpoenaingDiscovery Reveal Hidden Violations, supra note 7, at part VILE ("Gambling
Interests as Saviors or Exploiters of Native American Sovereignty?").
330. Respondents' Answering Brief at 3, City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment
Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev. filed Feb. 2, 2000) (No. 33812).
331. Id. at 8.
332. Id. at 7. See generally Craig Offman, The 10 Most Corrupt Cities in America,
GEORGE, Mar. 1998, at 90 (including Las Vegas as one of the nation's most corrupt cities).
For advertisements attacking the casino interests of Steve Wynn, Bill Boyd, Jackie
Gaughan, as well as Becky, Ted, and Jack Binion as those interests interfaced with
Pappas, see Eminent Domain or Eminent Thievery, LAS VEGAS REV. J., May 20, 2003, at
B3; Eminent Domain Case Draws National Outrage, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Apr. 1, 2003, at
B3.
333. Letter from Harry Pappas to Tom Grey, Exec. Dir., Nat'l Coalition Against
Legalized Gambling (Dec. 9, 2003) (detailing reasons Pappaswas appealed) (public letter
on file with author) [hereinafter Pappas Summary].
334. U.S. CONST. amend V.
335. Pappas Summary, supra note 333 (emphasis in original).
336. See supra note 119-25 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 330-33 and accompanying text.
338. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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to Pappas,"public use" included such facilities as roads, public buildings,
and schools. 3 9
Harry Pappas summarized his family's frustration from the 1993
inception of the case to an adverse 2003 decision by the Nevada Supreme
Court:3 4° "It should be noted that enormous amounts of 'campaign
donations' are given to Nevada Supreme Court justices from the casino
If the gambling industry were to win Pappas, the
industry."3 4'
practical impact would be to allow "eminent domain to be used to seize
small business, mom & pop businesses, homes and property for casinos
and topless club expansions [and] would finally give casinos and topless
34 2
clubs a constitutional standing that they have never enjoyed before."
In league with virtually unlimited financial resources, progambling
interests could use eminent domain to become de facto and de jure
sovereigns.
2.

Dissecting the False Predicatesof Gambling's PR

a. Common Sense and Common Law: Duties by Gambling
Facilities to Known Pathological Gamblers. As in the judicial
trends of the 1950s and 1960s that dissected the false predicates of
racism and catalyzed the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, the U.S. judiciary
of the twenty-first century was posed with opportunities to expose the
false predicates of the gambling industry's PR. Courts had three
hundred years of common-law policies exemplified by the Statute of
34
In this
Anne 34 3 to prevent "Excessive and Deceitful Gaming."
345 and Williams.346
Poulos
were
cases
context, two leading-edge
Because Poulos was still pending a decision on the granting of class
action status in 2003, this discussion focuses on Williams and its judicial
history.
On March 5, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of defendant in Williams

339. See Pappas Summary, supra note 333.
340. City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev.
2003).
341. Pappas Summary, supra note 333.
342. Id.
343. See supra notes 318-26 and accompanying text.
344. Id.
345. For a background discussion of Poulos, see supra notes 119-25 and accompanying
text.
346. For a background discussion of Williams, see supra notes 89-97 and 115-18 and
accompanying text.
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v. Aztar.147 As precedent, the court cited to a recently decided 2003
Seventh Circuit case, Merrill v. Trump Indiana, Inc.,s in which a
pathological gambler convicted of robbing banks (supposedly to feed his
gambling habit) sued the Trump Indiana casino.349 Although the facts
and issues in Merrill could be distinguished from the pending Williams
case, the district court issued summary judgment in favor of defendant
Aztar.5 ° Williams was then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit,351 before which appellant claimed:
A. The Court Should Depart from Merrill and Hold, as the Indiana
Supreme Court Would Under the Circumstances Present in this Case,
that Indiana Law Recognizes a Duty of Reasonable Care on the Part
of a Casino Toward a Known Pathological Gambler.
B. In the Alternative, the Court Should Certify the Issue Presented in
this Case to the Indiana Supreme Court for its Resolution of the
Critical Question of Indiana State Law on Which Williams' Claims Are
Based.352
Appellee Aztar basically claimed that gambling facilities, specifically
casinos, had no common-law duty to keep known pathological gamblers
from destructive
gambling at casinos and that no such duty should be
3
created.1

While the Williams appeal, filed May 19, 2003, was being prepared,
the Indiana legislature was debating whether to codify a common-law
duty for casinos to prohibit the destructive gambling of known pathological gamblers (soon to be called "registered" or "self-excluded" gamblers).3 54 The Indiana legislation was prodded by the adverse decision
in Williams by the district court. 5 Indiana State Senator Larry E.
Lutz (D), representing Casino Aztar's district, attempted to kill this

347. Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., No. EV-01-75-C-TH, 2003 WL 1903369, at
*7-8 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 5, 2003).
348. 320 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003).
349. Id.
350. 2003 WL 1903369, at *7-8.
351. Brief of Appellant, Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp. (7th Cir. filed May 19,
2003) (No. 03-1822) [hereinafter Williams Appellant Brief].
352. Id. at i.
353. Brief of Appellee, Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp. (7th Cir. filed June 18,
2003) (No. 03-1822) [hereinafter Aztar Appellee Brief].
354. See Conference Committee Report, Engrossed H.B. 1740, 1st Sess., § 4, ch. 16, at
3-4 (2003) (codified as amended at IND. CODE §§ 4-22-2, 4-33-4) [hereinafter Conf. Comm.
Rep. in Support of Duty to Pathological Gamblers]; Pub. L. No. 143-2003, § 2 (effective date
July 1, 2003).
355. See Conf. Comm. Rep. in Support of Duty to Pathological Gamblers, supra note
354.
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legislation via procedural maneuvers, or alternatively
to grant de jure
3 56
immunity to casino-style facilities for most torts.
The legislature ultimately recognized and rejected Senator Lutz's
attempts to add tort immunity provisions for casinos." 7 Instead, the
legislature added responsibilities, and arguably a duty,358 to casinostyle gambling facilities to identify and exclude known pathological gamblers. 359
Losing the legislative struggle, the gambling lobbyists
succeeded, however, in maneuvering the drafting of precise regulations
to the purview of the Indiana Gaming Commission, where the lobbyists
had more influence to transfer more color of duty away from the
gambling facilities and impose the initial presumption of duty on the
pathological (addicted) gamblers.36 °
Under the shadow of the district court's summary judgment in
Williams on March 5, 2003,361 and concurrent with the drafting and
filing of the Williams appeal to the Seventh Circuit on May 19,
2003,362 the Indiana legislature enacted legislation (to go into effect
July 1, 2003) that was beneficial to the Williams appeal. 3
This
enacted legislation was obviously designed not only to assist the
Williams scenario, but also to prevent or reduce similar future scenarios
involving pathological gamblers. 3"
Despite these legislative enactments and the policy impetus prodding
the Indiana legislature, a less than cursory review of these developments
and the duty issues in the Williams appeal were raised by the Seventh
Circuit during oral arguments.36 5 Instead, the court focused on RICO
3 66
issues, which were subsequently reflected in the court's decision.
Accordingly, the RICO issues raised by the court extended the discussion.
When rendering its decision in Williams, the Seventh Circuit
expanded the RICO issues to a national scope. 6 7 In Poulos v. Caesars

356.
357.
358.
359.

Compare id. with IND. CODE § 4-33-4-7 (2003).
IND. CODE § 4-33-4-7.
Id.
Id. §§ 4-33-4-7(a)(1), (b).

360. Id. § 4-33-4-7(a)(1) ("program established under the rules of the commission").
361. 2003 WL 1903369, at *7-8.
362. See Williams Appellant Brief, supra note 351.
363. See supra note 354-60 and accompanying text.
364. Id.
365. Oral Arguments, Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp., U.S. Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, Chicago, IL, Oct. 22, 2003.
366. 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2003).
367. Id.
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World, Inc.,36 which was filed under RICO in 1994 and was still
pending in 2004, there were approximately seventy defendants,
including most casino companies, cruise lines with gambling, and slot
machine manufacturers.3 69 Aztar was also one of the defendants in
New York City
Poulos. 37 ° This case was filed by David Barrett of the
3 71

firm of Barrett, Gravante, Carpinello, and Stern, LLP.
In 1995 the district court in Florida transferred Poulos to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nevada.3 72 Poulos was brought under
RICO and alleged "inter alia repeated instances of mail fraud as the
predicate offenses forming the pattern of racketeering activity engaged
in by the defendant" 373 gambling facilities. In 1997 the Nevada U.S.
District Court denied, in particular, defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim,3 74 and multiple other motions by defendants
to dismiss the case on various grounds were also generally denied.375
Accordingly, it would be anticipated that similar challenges by defendant
Aztar to plaintiff Williams should have been similarly denied or
dismissed.
b. "Puffery," the Magic Dragon: Must RICO Fall Before
Fantasy? The Seventh Circuit rendered its decision in Williams on
December 5, 2003.376 The tenor of the decision appeared to be a design
to chill any RICO cases involving gamblers losses being filed in the
Seventh Circuit.37 7 With regard to Aztar's promotional mailings to
pathological gambler Williams, the court held that the RICO complaint
failed because "even if the statements in these communications could be
considered 'false' or 'misrepresentations,' it is clear that they are nothing
more than sales puffery on which no person of ordinary prudence and

368. Case No. CV-S-94-1126-DAE (RJJ)(base file), 2002 WL 1991180 (D. Nev. June 25,
2002).
369. Poulos Second Complaint, supra note 119.
370. Id. at 12.
371. Id. at 1.
372. See FraudLawsuit, supra note 121.
373. Affidavit of John Warren Kindt, Williams v. Aztar Ind. Gaming Corp. (7th Cir.
Dec. 17, 2003) (No. 03-1822). Poulos Second Complaint, supra note 119.
374. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
376. 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2003).
377. Id. For summaries of multiple cases and issues involving federal civil RICO
actions, see The Merger of Law and Politics in Gambling, supra note 277.
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comprehension would rely,"37 and then cited to two nongambling cases
for support. 79
In this pronouncement the court misinterpreted that: (1) generic sales
"puffery" or "puffing" to the pathological (addicted) gambler was more
parallel to psychological entrapment380 with Pavlovian aspects;"' (2)
a pathological gambler does not constitute a person of ordinary prudence
and comprehension with regard to gambling;38 2 (3) defendant casino
allegedly caused or substantially contributed to plaintiff's becoming a
pathological gambler;3 83 (4) defendant casino allegedly knew that
plaintiff was a pathological gambler; 3"' and (5) the very policy of
enacting RICO was to bring cases such as Williams into the federal court
system. 3s5 The court thus made assumptions involving the facts of
"puffery" as delimited by academics, pathological (addicted) gambling as
delimited by experts, and the nexus between these elements without
allowing those facts to be gathered by a trial court. It was unfortunate
that the Seventh Circuit, which had been so progressive and forward
thinking in other areas, missed the opportunity to advance or even
explore the issues in Williams.88

378. 351 F.3d at 299.
379. Assocs. in Adolescent Psychiatry, S.C. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 941 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1991) (referencing examples that would be considered generic puffery, but does not discuss
puffery per se); Reynolds v. E. Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1989) (referring
to an advertisement extolling a subdivision as "no more than common sales puffing").
380. See Professor Emeritus Calvin I. Claus, Gambling Behavior: Enticement then
Addiction, Presentation Before the Illinois Gaming Board (May 3, 2000) [hereinafter
Professor Claus] (on file with Illinois Gaming Board).
See generally Crime Multiplier, supra note 61, at 301-04 ("Pavlovian
381. Id.
Marketing: Hooking New Addicted Gamblers?"). Gambling marketers cannot reasonably
claim that they are not tempted to find the "hooks" for all gamblers.
A 1996 article in USA Today apparently concluded that gambling marketers were
intrigued by the search to create gambling's "Holy Grail" slot addictive game. Gambling's
"Holy Grail"Slot Addictive Game, supra note 139, at Al.
382. DSM-LV, supra note 3, at 615-18, § 312.31 ("pathological gambling").
383. Williams Complaint, supra note 92.
384. Id.
385. For examples of RICO's policy parallels to further judicial goals in the Civil Rights
Movement, as enumerated by Notre Dame Law Professor Robert Blakey who co-authored
RICO, see G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster
Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposalsfor Reform: "Mother of God-Is This
the End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REv. 851, 921-24 (1990) [hereinafter Myths to Rewrite
RICO]. For the policy impact of Williams as already generating changes by gambling
companies, see Staff Report, Park Place Casinos Start Lists to Ban Adddicts, LAS VEGAS
SUN, Dec. 9, 2003, at Al.
386. 351 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 2003). In 1994 American Medical Association Resolution
430 estimated the socio-medical costs of gambling at $40 billion per year. Am. Med. Ass'n,
House of Delegates Resolution 430 (A-94) (1994). Adjusted to 2003 dollars, the AMA's
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With regard to the interface between sales puffery and the pathological gambler, some psychological principles should be reviewed.
Psychology Professor Calvin Claus has delimited the scientific principles
involved as beyond controversy. 87 In his 2000 testimony before the
Illinois Gaming Board, Professor Claus cited to the basic textbook
Schedules ofReinforcement by famed Harvard Psychology Professor B.F.
Skinner."
The Pavlovian aspects of gambling38 9 were summarized as
"[p]igeon, rat or human, gambling is addictive."
If you want to train a laboratory rat to push a button, don't reward
him with a food pellet after every push-vary the number of pushes
required for the payoff. Give him a pellet after four pushes one time,
16 the next, then three, then 23.
By manipulating the length between payoffs, researchers can lead a
rat, pigeon or human into addictive behaviors.
"They could stretch the ratio to the point where that rat would literally
drop over from exhaustion," [Professor Claus noted]."s
In this context, it was common knowledge that exhausted and oblivious
gamblers constituted a continuing problem in gambling facilities,
particularly casinos.391
"Puffery" must be closely monitored so that it is not fake and
misleading. 392 The most-published academic in the area of "puffing
and deceptiveness" has summarized the legal policy: "lies" disguised as
"puffery" should not be permitted anywhere. 93 If this is the rule when
marketing is directed at a totally competent patron or the general public,

estimate would be approximately $70 billion in costs which is more than the entire
revenues derived from U.S. gambling of approximately $65 billion.
In 2003 the Maine Medical Association publicly opposed the siting of a casino anywhere
in the state. Maine Medical Ass'n, Public Health Comm., Resolution Against Locating a
Casino in Maine (2003).
387. Professor Claus, supra note 380.
388.

See C.B. FERSTER & B.F. SKINNER, SCHEDULES OF REINFORCEMENT (1957).

389. Burt Constable, Pigeon, Rat or Human, Gambling is Addictive, DAILY HERALD
(Arlington Heights, IL), May 6, 2000, at 8.
390. Id.
391. Id. See generally B.F. Skinner, Freedom at Last From the Burden of Taxation,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1977, at 29 (ridiculing legalized gambling and its promoters).
392. Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other "Loophole"Claims: How the Law's "Don'tAsk,
Don't Tell"Policy Condones FraudulentFalsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & COM. 49,49 (1998)
[hereinafter Puffery and Other "Loophole"Claims].
393. Id. See also Ivan L. Preston, The Definition of Deceptiveness in Advertising and
Other Commercial Speech, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 1035 (1990); Ivan L. Preston & Jef I.
Richards, Consumer Miscomprehension and Deceptive Advertising, 68 B.U. L. REv. 431
(1988). For a complete analysis of these issues, see IVAN L. PRESTON, THE GREAT
AMERICAN BLOWUP: PUFFERY IN ADVERTISING AND SELLING (U. Wis. Press 1996).
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a fortiori the puffery has crossed into allurement or entrapment when
the patron is (1) a pathological gambler, (2) known to be a pathological
gambler by the marketer gambling3 facility, and (3) specifically targetmarketed by the gambling facility.

9

Sociologists and gambling marketers have basically organized
gamblers into four categories. "Pathological (hooked or addicted)
gamblers" constitute the first category, and they satisfy a diagnostic
screen, primarily the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS 3 95 or
secondarily the Massachusetts Gambling Screen (MAGS) 96 or thirdly
the National Opinion Research Center DSM. gv Screen (NODS). 95
Pathological gamblers consist of 1.5 to 2 percent of the public, and
problem gamblers constitute another 3 to 5 percent of the public. These
two categories of gamblers lose 26.5 to 55 percent of the monies collected
by casinos. 3a9 By definition, pathological gamblers will gamble away
all of their resources and then steal to continue. 4°
"Problem gamblers" are delimited as the second-most destructive
category of gamblers and they satisfy enough of the diagnostic criteria
in a gambling screen to be considered as gambling destructively.
Problem gamblers constitute 3 to 5 percent of the public.40 '
"At-risk gamblers" satisfy only one or two of the diagnostic criteria,
but these gamblers basically are gambling more than they can afford

394. References to issues involving deceptive advertising as it interfaces with
regulation by the Federal Trade Commission provides some interesting insights. See
generally Ivan L. Preston, Extrinsic Evidence in Federal Trade Commission Deceptiveness
Cases, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 633 (1987); Dee Pridgen & Ivan L. Preston, Enhancingthe
Flow of Information in the Marketplace: From Caveat Emptor to Virginia Pharmacyand
Beyond at the Federal Trade Commission, 14 GA. L. REV. 635 (1980); see also Ivan L.
Preston, The Federal Trade Commission's Identification of Implications as Constituting
Deceptive Advertising, 57 CINCINNATI L. REV. 1243 (1989); Ivan L. Preston & Jef I.
Richards, Consumer Miscomprehension as a Challenge to FTC Prosecutionsof Deceptive
Advertising, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605 (1986).
395. See, e.g., Henry R. Lesieur & Sheila B. Blume, The South Oaks Gambling Screen
(SOGS): A New Instrument for Identification of Pathological Gamblers, 144 AM. J.
PsYCHIATRY, September 1987, at 1184-87. In the 1980 and 1990s, over two-thirds of all
studies utilized the SOGS. See, e.g., Harvard Addictions Meta-Analysis, supra note 56,
App. II.
396. See, e.g., Harvard Addictions Meta-Analysis, supra note 56, App. II.
397. DSM-IV, supra note 3, at 615-18 (which NORC used as its basis for a revised
screen called NODS).
398. See Natl Opinion Res. Center et al., Gambling Impact and Behavior Study:
Report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (1999).
399. For a table, see Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 2, at 25. For several categories of
relevant statistics, see Gambling Monies Tainted the Research, supra note 50.
400. See DSM-IV, supra note 3, at 615-18.
401. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 68, at Table 4-2.
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recreationally. "At-risk gamblers" constitute approximately 5 percent of
the general public.4 °2
Finally, the "recreational gambler" constitutes the fourth category.
Recreational gamblers evidence no adverse effects from gambling. This
category constitutes roughly 80 percent of the public, but these gamblers
lose only approximately 30 percent of the dollars collected by casinos.
By design or not, therefore, the cream markets for gambling facilities are
pathological and problem gamblers.
Puffing to the recreational gambler is simple advertising. Ethicists
might decry or raise problematic scenarios of marketing to at-risk
gamblers and problem gamblers. However, marketing to pathological
(addicted) gamblers generates definite self-destructive and communitydestructive behavior. If a gambling facility's marketers are unaware
that the pathological gambler is indeed pathological, the marketing
facility has a defense. However, once the gambling facility has actual or
constructive notice that a gambler is pathological, any defense should be
lost.
Furthermore, the intended target marketing to the known pathological
gambler (who is virtually helpless to resist) raises issues of mail fraud
designed to take all of the gambler's resources. In the area of player's
cards and fun cards, which track the gambler's credit, resource base, and
degree of gambling, the key question then is when the gambling facility
had actual or constructive notice that the gambler is pathological.
This analysis posits that gamblers losing 10 percent of their assets as
delimited by their credit reports or resources listed on their player's
cards or fun cards must be (1) stopped by the gambling facilities issuing
those cards, (2) advised of their rights (including invoking the Statute
of Anne), and (3) banned from those gambling facilities. Gambling
facilities miscalculating their "tithes" should be held to criminal
sanctions for fraud.
Do gamblers have to lose 100 percent or 50 percent of their assets as
delimited on the card before the gambling facility has the duty to
question them and advise them of their rights to be self-banned or
casino-banned from the facility or placed on a legal list of disassociated
persons? If gamblers are not so advised, have gamblers been deprived
of their property by a state-sponsored action without due process of law
as required by the Fourteenth Amendment?

402. Id.
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c. Tracking Cards Issued by Gambling Facilities: Actual or
Implied Intent to Capture Gamblers' Resources? Issued by
progressively more gambling facilities during the computer-sophisticated
twenty-first century, casinos interface fun cards with a gambler's credit
report which estimates or has actual numbers of an individual's gross
worth, net worth, or both. Casinos justified this tactic because they said
they needed to know whether a person who lost $100,000 could afford
the loss. Casinos claim there was no way to know whether the $100,000
loser was a millionaire or not, but multi-millionaire gamblers were
routinely tracked by gambling facilities who designated such gamblers
"whales" (as compared to "small fish" gamblers).
More importantly, casino fun cards or player's cards were becoming
progressively more intrusive into the financial resources linked to
common business credit reports. In fact, the tracking of gamblers via
fun cards was goal-oriented toward delimiting each gambler's total
financial resources. Gamblers hesitating to gamble were "comped" via
enticements, particularly free alcohol, to keep them gambling (often to
the gambler's drunken disadvantage via impaired judgment).4 3
Gambling facilities utilizing player's cards, in particular, have actual
or constructive knowledge of each cardmember's resource base. At least
since 1997, the theories of gambling's marketers have been in the public
domain as exemplified by Time Magazine's article, "How Casinos Hook
You: The Gambling Industry is Creating High-Tech Databases to Reel
in Compulsive Players. " 4
By purchasing lists from credit card companies, the casinos know what
you buy, and then they can track census data to approximate your
home value and income. Then there are the direct-mail lists. One
such list from the early 1990s was baldly [sic] called the "Compulsive
Gamblers Special" and promised to deliver 200,000 names of people

with "unquenchable appetites for all forms of gambling." Another list
features "some 250,000 hardcore gamblers." Yet another purveys the
names of 80,000 people who responded to a vacation-sweepstakestelemarketing pitch.40 5
Thus, if the gambler has a resource base of $200,000 and loses $100,000,
socio-business ethicists should be concerned. However, if a gambler such
as Williams loses 50 percent of their total financial resources, and the
gambling facility knows or should know that these gamblers are

403.

See supra note 151-76 and accompanying text.

404. S.C. Gwynne, How Casinos Hook You: The GamblingIndustry is CreatingHighTech Databasesto Reel in Compulsive Players, TIME, Nov. 17, 1997, at 68-69 [hereinafter
How Casinos Hook You].
405.

Id. at 69.
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pathological (addicted) gamblers, the gambling facility should have a
duty not to take advantage of the addiction.
A fortiori, if the gambling facility is served with actual written notice
(from a reasonable source) that the gambler is a pathological "hooked"
gambler, the gambling facility should have a duty not to impoverish the
gambler. If the notified gambling facility advertises again or markets
further to the known pathological gambler, the question is whether that
marketing constitutes "puffing," allurement, or entrapment of the
pathological gambler (who receives the marketing and loses his entire
financial assets).
These were the issues in Williams, which the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals apparently misunderstood on oral argument. The court
merely delimited the gambling facility's marketing as "puffing" and cited
to two nongambling cases for support.4 6
As has been recognized by the common law for hundreds of years and
as exemplified by the 1710 Statute of Anne to prohibit "Excessive and
Deceitful Gaming" 4 7 via treble damages, gambling involves allurement
and the entrapment of vulnerable gamblers.
Professor Ronald J. Faber's 1992 article title summarizes the
marketing difference: "Money Changes Everything.""' In modern
times, the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnosticand Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders"°9 removes most ambiguities and delimits
that the "pathological gambler," like an alcoholic, can basically only
resist via psychological help such as provided by Gamblers Anonymous
(modeled on Alcoholics Anonymous).41 °
The pathological gambler cannot disassociate from most direct
gambling marketing. This scenario has been compared to a bar owner
knocking on a known alcoholic's door and throwing alcohol in the
alcoholic's face-with the "intent" of getting the alcoholic back in the bar
spending money. Numerous academic publications point to the special
problems of marketing, as they could interface with the gambling
41
addict. '

406. See supra notes 378-79 and accompanying text.
407. See discussion supra notes 318-26 and accompanying text.
408. Ronald J. Faber, Money Changes Everything, 35 AM. BEHAv. SCI. 809, 810, 814
(1992) (starting the linkages involving pathological gambling to money and referencing a
1989 study by gambling expert Durand Jacobs, Loma Linda Med. School); see also Gary A.
Christenson, M.D., et al., Compulsive Buying: Descriptive Characteristicsand Psychiatric
Comorbidity, 55 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 5 (1994); Thomas C. O'Guinn & Ronald J. Faber,
Compulsive Buying: A PhenomenologicalExploration, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 147 (1989).
409. DSM-LV, supra note 3.
410. Id.
411. See, e.g., supra notes 3, 60, 380, 404, 408 and accompanying text.
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There is no such marketing as "puffing" to a pathological (addicted)
gambler. The marketing to a known pathological gambler is purposely
designed to lure if not entrap the pathological gambler-and to re-lure
or entrap the recovering pathological gambler.4 12 Gambling facilities
cannot claim that they are unaware that 26.5 percent to 55 percent of
their "win" comes from pathological and problem gamblers-allegedly the
cream market percentage.413
The legal discovery of the marketing techniques utilized by gambling
facilities, as was occurring in Poulos, should provide the direct link of
intent to market to the cream market for gambling facilities.4 14 In
Williams there should have been similar discovery opportunities. It can
be convincingly argued that intentional marketing to known pathological
gamblers can easily qualify as intent to re-lure or re-entrap to take the
money of a disadvantaged or financially mentally 41incompetent
person
5
(before some competitor gambling facility does so).
This scenario satisfies the tests for mail fraud to establish RICO
violations, as were suggested by the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Williams.
However, by comparison, in Poulos, establishing such a nexus was
apparently not required by the Nevada District Court when it dismissed
defendants' challenges to plaintiffs' RICO claims.416
Furthermore, the policies behind enacting RICO included initiating
and promulgating such protections for pathological gamblers-similar to
the legislative policies that supported and encouraged the Civil Rights
Movement and antitrust protections. 417 As enumerated by Notre Dame
Law Professor Robert Blakey, one of the principal authors of RICO:
Similarly, when elements opposed to RICO suggest that its subject
matter be enforced only or mainly criminally, they really mean that it
be enforced inadequately or not at all .... When civil rights legislation was under consideration in the 1960s, many critics emphasized
states' rights, which were then, at least for some, only a smokescreen
behind which to hide a rotten system of segregation. Criticism of RICO
based on federalism also looks like a smoke screen behind which the
swindlers and others seek to hide.418
The federal and state judiciaries will eventually be persuaded by such
policies and incorporate them more pervasively into the common law.

412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

See, e.g., id.; How CasinosHook You, supra note 404, at 68-69.
For a table by Professor Henry Lesieur, see Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 2, at 25.
See, e.g., How Casinos Hook You, supra note 404, at 68-69.
Id.
See, e.g., supra note 122 and accompanying text.
Myths to Rewrite RICO, supra note 385, at 924.
Id.
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The most socially-conscious judiciary responding to litigating counsel will
be the vanguard. For example, the counsel in Williams had a bona fide
right, even a responsibility, to ask the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its
earlier decisions.419
VII.

CONCLUSION

A. The Typical Casino Brings in Over $1 Million Each Day in
Customer Losses: Scofflaw Gambling Interests Thereby Dominate and
Control the Legal and Political Systems
By 2002, each day of a casino's nonoperation constituted an opportunity cost of $1 million.42 ° All laws, regulations, fines, and penalties in
nonconformity with gambling interests could be ignored because the
consequences were never more than $1 million per day.4 2' For example, regulatory fines were typically only a few thousand dollars, and
lawsuits could be settled for "undisclosed amounts" less than $1 million
per day.
In an Alice in Wonderland juxtaposition, what was illegal before the
legalization of casinos becomes legal. Gambling interests de facto make
the laws by monetarily dominating the legal and political processes. For
example, the seizure of someone else's land by casino interests does not
stop the building processes, and any resulting legal action becomes
merely a cost of doing business, as exemplified by the Las Vegas
Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas422 case in Nevada, lasting
from 1994 to 2004. With an income of over $1 million per day, casino
interests seemingly do not care if they win, lose, or settle any given
lawsuit. For example in Rosemont, Illinois, elements of the casino
construction were initiated and continued despite the violation of Illinois
regulations and the nonapproval of the Illinois Gaming Board. 4m

419. See supra notes 348-53 and accompanying text.
420. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
421. See generally Gambling Industry PerpetualNon-Compliance, supra note 204.
422. See, e.g., Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, No. A327519
(13th Dist. Ct. Nev. 1996). For a summary of the abuses in this case, see Dana Berliner,
Government Theft: The Top 10 Abuses of Eminent Domain, Castle Coalition (Mar. 2002),
availableat http'//www.castlecoalition.org/top-10-abuses/; see also Order Granting Motion,
Motion to Expedite the Briefing and Resolution of Appeal, Las Vegas Downtown
Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas (Nev. Sup. Ct. 2002 (No. 39255)); Respondents' Brief at
3 (No. 33812) (attorneys for respondents, A. Grant Gerber & Assoc., Elko, NV).
423. See, e.g., Dave Newbart, Rosemont Mayor Looks at Options for Casino, CmI.
SUN-TIMEs, May 4, 2000, at 4. "The casino project is tied up in court in a dispute over
where the casino should be located. But Rosemont already has begun to build a
$42 million parking garage and is sending the bills to Emerald Casino, operators of the
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The socioeconomic history of legalized gambling revealed that these
types of problems, compounded by corrupt governmental decisionmaking,
were inherent impacts of government-sanctioned gambling. In commonlaw countries in particular, the court systems promised the public some
relief from "excessive and deceitful gaming."
With decriminalized gambling spreading throughout the United States
and the world, the solutions appeared to be predicated upon large
punitive damage awards and treble damages. As gambling facilities
earned millions of dollars per day and as accounting and regulatory
systems historically degenerated into ineffective "window dressings,"4 24
the last solutions to restrain the progambling interests were the specters
of large punitive damage awards and treble damages. Probably one of
the first, if not the first, instances of treble damages was legislation in
1710 with the Statute of Anne. Treble damages, like the punitive
damages which developed later, were designed to punish and deter
inappropriate behaviors. In the twenty-first century, U.S. gambling
facilities were vulnerable to mega-damages predicated on mega-lawsuits.
B. "Follow the Money" as the Threshold Test of Credibility in
Gambling Issues: Directly Ask Whether the Person Interviewed Has or
Expects to Directly or Indirectly Benefit Financiallyfrom the Gambling
Industry
The socioeconomic history of legalized gambling has demonstrated that
gambling monies have invalidated decisionmaking in multiple areas. 5
Independent analysts in the twenty-first century needed to follow the
money to recognize the "gold fever" mesmerizing many decisionmakers
dealing with legalized gambling.42 Once under oath in legal discovery

proposed Rosemont casino." Id.; see Tim Novak, Mob Ties Sink Rosemont Casino, CHI.
SuN-TIMEs, Jan. 31, 2001, at 1; see also Michael Higgins & Douglas Holt, Gaming Board
Rejects Rosemont Casino Bid, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2001, § 1, at 1.
424. For examples of regulatory problems, see Brett Pulley, The Spinning Door: A
Special Report;RegulatorsFindEasy Pathto GamblingIndustry Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
1998, at Al.
425. Id.; see supra note 49 and accompanying text. See also When Gambling Comes to
Town, supra note 49, at 36-38; Casino Backlash, supra note 28, at Al. See generally
Loretta Tofani, Gambling Industry Seeks a WinningImage, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 6, 1998,
at Al; David L. Wheeler, A Surge of Research on Gambling is Financed in Part by the
Industry Itself, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 5, 1999, at A17, A18. Several articles in the
L.A Times ran each day beginning the week of December 13, 1998. See, e.g., Casino
Backlash, supra note 28; Matea Gold, Treatment Options Scarce for Gamblers, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1998, at Al; April Lynch, All Bets Are Off, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 1997, at
38-39; April Lynch, Heavy Betting, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 1997, at 40-41.
426. See, e.g., supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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knew they would
and thereafter sworn in court, U.S. gambling interests
427
be disadvantaged regarding plaintiffs' claims.

427. In Williams, for example, sworn expert testimony would have been revealing. By
comparison, in 2000 the senior vice president of marketing for Harrah's casinos, Rich
Mirman, summarized the marketing philosophy and techniques utilized by his company.
Once the new gamblers come out of the introductory program of marketing and gathering
information from them, Mirman explains "our 'Pavlovian' marketing takes over. Here we
have a mathematical model that tells us what appeals to specific gamblers based on data
tracking their previous behavior at our properties. Our computer is programmed to spit
out behavior modification reports that target customers .... " ROBERT L. SHOOK, JACKPOT!:
HARRAH'S WINNING SECRETS FOR CUSTOMER LOYALTY 231, 310 (John Wiley & Sons. Pub.
2003) (section titled "A Pavlovian Approach to Marketing").
Unlike some other gambling facilities, Mirman indicated that on Harrah's player's cards,
"we don't have any income or credit information (unless they [the gamblers] specifically
sign up for credit)." Id. at 232.
However, any gambler who seeks credit for continued gambling has automatically
fulfilled one (and perhaps three) of the ten diagnostic criteria established by the American
Psychiatric Association for a "pathological gambler" (as well as for a "problem gambler").
DSM-IV, supra note 3, at 615-18. Furthermore, satisfying just this one criterion almost
automatically satisfies the diagnostic criteria for an "at-risk" gambler pursuant to the U.S.
National Research Council and the U.S. National Gambling Commission. NGISC FINAL
REPORT, supra note 68, at 4-2, 4-6.
Accordingly, gambling facilities monitoring, assisting, or granting any gambler credit
over $100 have constructive knowledge that the gambler has: (1) automatically satisfied
the diagnostic criteria for an "at-risk" gambler, (2) probably satisfies the diagnostic criteria
for a "problem gambler" (i.e., satisfies 3 or 4 criteria), and (3) could easily satisfy the
diagnostic criteria for a "pathological (addicted) gambler" (i.e., satisfies 5 or more criteria).
Theoretically, any gambling facility granting credit (particularly over $200) to a gamble has
actual or constructive knowledge that the gambler is problematic. See supra notes 395-419
and accompanying text.
For examples of the Indiana Legislature's response to public pressure to enact a commonlaw duty by casinos to pathological gamblers as generated by Williams, see Statement of
Walter Schulz, Indiana Coalition Against Legalized Gambling, before the Indiana Gaming
Commission, Sept. 12,2003; Lesley Stedman Weidenbener, Tougher Gambler Ban Program
Urged: Indiana Casinos Should Monitor Excessive Losses, Lobbyist Insists, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, KY), Oct. 25, 2003; Lesley Stedman, Self-Imposed Bans On Gamblers Studied:
All 10 Casinos in the State Will Share Lists, COURIER-J (Louisville, KY), July 12, 2003;
Editorial, GamblersBeware: It's Still Your Fault, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 12, 2003; Russ
Pulliam, The GamblingIndustry, Like Tobacco, Could End Up Liable, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Mar. 2, 2003.

